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ARTICLE

SIGNATURE GATHERING IN THE INITIATIVE
PROCESS:
HOW DEMOCRATIC IS IT?
Richard J. Ellis*

Elections lie at the heart of America's political system. They
are the means by which we choose our leaders and nominate our
candidates. Media coverage is election-centered, focused on the
campaign and horse race analyses of who is ahead and
predictions of who will win. Most citizens do not begin to pay
much attention to politics until about a month or two before the
election. And of course elected officials are almost always
thinking about the next election and raising the money they
need to mount the next campaign. We might wish our elected
officials spent less time thinking about reelection, or that more
voters paid closer attention to politics between elections, or that
the media were less focused on the horse race and more
attentive to the issues. But in truth, the behavior of the media,
candidates, and voters works reasonably well most of the time in
scrutinizing the actions of candidates and elected officials. Not
perfectly, but reasonably well.
The same is arguably true for initiative elections. To be
* Dept. of Politics, Willamette University, Salem, OR 97301.
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sure, when there are eighteen initiatives on a ballot, as there
were in Oregon in 2000, it taxes the ordinary voter's ability to
make informed decisions. But most of the time voters can use
information shortcuts to make good decisions. Few voters will
understand the many ramifications of complex proposals, but
voters can ask themselves the much simpler question: who is for
it and who is against it? The more money is spent in a
campaign, the more likely voters will find out which groups are
behind a measure and which groups oppose the measure. And so
long as voters have an attitude toward those groups - whether
they be labor unions or anti-tax groups, Democrats or
Republicans, environmental organizations or pro-life groups voters can generally arrive at a reasonably informed decision.'
But there is a crucial difference between candidate
campaigns and initiative campaigns. Candidates who appear on
the ballot in November are generally there because they won a
primary election some months earlier. They are on the ballot, in
other words, because voters of a political party elected them to
represent the party. And while turnout in primary elections is
typically lower than in general elections, candidates must still
vie for support in a publicly contested election. Initiatives, in
contrast, appear on the ballot without having been selected by
the people. Moreover, there is typically little or no media
scrutiny of the qualifying phase of initiative campaigns and
voters pay virtually no attention to this stage of the process.
The premise of this article is that the signature gathering
phase of the initiative process deserves greater scrutiny by
voters, by the media, and by state elections officials as well as by
scholars. The signature gathering phase of initiative campaigns
should be treated with the same seriousness of purpose and
intense publicity that is generally accorded contested
nomination elections.
I. CONFRONTING Two OBJECTIONS
Before proceeding with this argument, it is necessary first
to confront two possible objections to this line of reasoning.
First, isn't signature gathering democracy in action? Indeed isn't
it a higher form of democracy since it requires a dedicated band
of public-spirited volunteers, committed to their cause, braving
the elements in order to obtain the signatures needed for their
1.
See SHAUN BOWLER AND TODD DONOVAN,
VOTING, AND DIRECT DEMOCRACY (1998).
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petition? What could be more civic-spirited than giving up one's
leisure time to stand outside a supermarket or inside a shopping
mall, asking fellow citizens to take a moment out of their busy
day to consider a pressing public issue? In a world filled with
professional politicians, highly paid lobbyists, selfish interest
groups, and privatized citizens, the act of one citizen beseeching
another for a signature seems a testament to the true meaning
of democracy.
This is the romance of the initiative process, but the reality
of the street is often something different. Gathering signatures
has increasingly become a business, and like any other business
it is run for profit. In states like Oregon and California, where
the initiative is used most frequently, the great majority of those
people behind petition tables are not idealistic volunteers but
are instead interested mercenaries, bounty hunters, paid by the
signature, and largely indifferent to the substance of the
petition. Many would be as gratified to have you sign a petition
that called for a raise in taxes as they would be to get your
signature on a petition seeking a reduction in taxes. And they
would be happier still if you signed both petitions, and perhaps
another two or three or five while you are at it. The price of your
signature varies, depending on the outcome of the bidding and
bargaining between initiative sponsors, signature companies,
independent contractors, and signature solicitors. It may be
worth as little as seventy-five cents, but if the initiative sponsor
is desperate enough or wealthy enough its value may climb to
many times that amount.
So what? We all know that politics is suffused with money.
Candidates spend hundreds of thousands and even millions of
dollars to run for office. Corporations and labor unions spend
cartfuls of cash lobbying the legislature. Why should we grow
faint of heart when money is spent in the service of initiatives?
"All of politics is run by money," observes Oregon's leading
initiative activist Bill Sizemore. "To say it should be different for
the people is hypocritical. '2 Lloyd Marbet, a left-wing initiative
proponent, agrees with the right-wing Sizemore: "Paying people
to petition is no different in my mind than giving money to
people to get them elected. '3 These defenders of the initiative
process raise an important challenge: Why should we be more
2. John Henrikson, Voters Get a Grip on Government, STATESMAN JOURNAL
(Salem, Or.), July 8, 1994, at A2.
3. Dan Bender, Political Foes Ally for Citizens' Rights, STATESMAN JOURNAL
(Salem, Or.), October 2,1995, at A2.
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wary about the role of money in the initiative process than in
candidate elections? Are those who lambast "the initiative
industry complex" simply being hypocritical?
The hypocrisy charge misses the mark for two reasons.
First, under current campaign finance laws individuals often are
limited in what they can give to a candidate, whereas there are
no limits on what individuals can contribute to an initiative,
either in the signature gathering phase or in the electoral
campaign. If paying people to petition is, as Marbet says, no
different from giving money to candidates, then that is an
argument for restricting the amount people can contribute to an
initiative campaign (or for abolishing laws limiting contributions
to candidate campaigns). Second, a candidate from a major party
appears on the ballot in the general election only after winning a
primary election decided by voters from that candidate's party.
In contrast, initiatives generally appear on the ballot without
any show of public support apart from the signatures gathered.
If signatures gathered are not an indicator of public sentiment
but merely a function of money, then critics are right to single
out the role of money in the initiative process. If, as Philip
Dubois and Floyd Feeney maintain, "political interests with
sufficient funding and professional assistance can qualify nearly
anything they want for the ballot," then that raises serious
questions about the initiative's role as an instrument of popular
4
democracy.
Even if one concedes that ballot access may be bought, one
still needs to confront a second objection to focusing critical
scrutiny on the signature gathering phase of the initiative
process. Many initiative proponents insist it does not really
matter how an initiative gets on the ballot because ultimately it
is the people who decide. As Dane Waters of the Initiative and
Referendum Institute put it when asked about the large number
of initiatives Sizemore qualified for the Oregon 2000 ballot: "It's
really irrelevant who puts it on the ballot, because Oregonians,
and only Oregonians, can vote yes or no."5 What matters is not
so much how a measure came to be on the ballot, but whether
voters approve it or not. No matter how an initiative qualifies, if
it passes it has demonstrated that it represents the will of the
4.
PHILIP L. DuBois & FLOYD FEENEY, LAWMAKING BY INITIATIVE: ISSUES,
OPTIONS AND COMPARISONS 102 (1998).

5.

Outsiders Finance Ballot Measures, Associated Press State & Local Wire (July

30, 2000). See also, PATRICK B. McGUIGAN, THE POLITICS OF DIRECT DEMOCRACY IN THE
1980s: CASE STUDIES IN POPULAR DECISION MAKING 119 (1985).
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people. Voters always have the final say.
The trouble with this account is that it ignores the power
bestowed upon the individuals and organizations who frame the
issue. As anyone familiar with polling knows, public opinion on
many issues is extraordinarily sensitive to question wording.
Ask people whether they support spending for the "poor" and
their responses are far more favorable than if they are asked
about spending on "welfare." Similarly, people have a much
more negative reaction to the term "preferential treatment" than
they do to "affirmative action." Large majorities agree that a
terminally ill person should be helped by a physician to "die
with dignity," but many fewer support "physician-assisted
suicide." The answer a pollster gets depends in large part on the
6
way the question is posed.
Question wording, for instance, was central to the battle
over Proposition 209, a 1996 initiative that banned state
affirmative action programs in California. The sponsors were
careful not to mention affirmative action; instead the initiative
prohibited the state from "discriminating against, or granting
preferential treatment to, any individual or group" on the basis
of race or gender. Polls showed that overwhelming majorities
supported this language, but support plummeted when
respondents were asked about outlawing state affirmative action
programs for women and minorities. Conscious of the vital
difference that wording makes, Republican Attorney General
Dan Lungren, a strong critic of affirmative action programs,
avoided any mention of affirmative action in the 100 word title
and summary of the initiative that appeared on the ballot.
Opponents of Proposition 209 took the Attorney General to
court, and a Superior Court judge directed Lungren to rewrite
the summary because omitting affirmative action misled voters
7
about "the main purpose and the chief point of the initiative."
Upon appeal, a District Court rejected the lower court's
judgment. The title and summary, the court concluded, conveyed
to the public "the general purpose" of the proposition. "We
cannot fault the Attorney General," the court concluded, "for

6. See, e.g., Tom W. Smith, That Which We Call Welfare by Any Other Name
Would Smell Sweeter: An Analysis of the Impact of Question Wording on Response
Patterns, 51 PUB. OPINION Q. 75, 75-83 (1987); William A. Lund, Note, What's in a
Name? The Battle Over Ballot Titles in Oregon, 34 WILLAMETTE L. REv. 143, 143-67
(1998).
7.
LYDIA CHAVEz, THE COLOR BIND: CALIFORNIA'S BATTLE TO END AFFIRMATIVE
ACTION 80, 145-46 (1998).
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refraining from the use of such an amorphous, value-laden term"
as affirmative action. The decision not to include the words
"affirmative action" was among the most critical ingredients in
the success of Proposition 209.8
The importance of question wording was underlined the
following year when a proposition to "end the use of affirmative
action for women and minorities" was defeated by voters in
The original language of the Houston
Houston, Texas.9
initiative had been virtually identical to Proposition 209, and
pre-election polling showed strong support for the measure.
However, Houston's mayor, a supporter of affirmative action,
persuaded the city council to amend the proposition so that
instead of calling for an end to "discrimination and preferential
treatment" in public employment and contracting, the measure
called for an end to affirmative action in public employment and
contracting. 10 After the measure was defeated, the initiative's
sponsor, Edward Blum, complained that the city's rewording
had "sabotaged" the initiative, and he took the city to court.11 As
in California, the courts were divided. In 1998, a state district
judge nullified the election result on the grounds that the
revised wording did not fairly convey the original wording of the
initiative petition, and required the city to hold a second
election, though the judge stopped short of telling the city what
language to use. 12 The following year, the Court of Appeals
overruled the district judge's ruling, arguing that the new
language was not misleading because "by definition, the term
'affirmative action' encompasses minority- or gender-based
'quotas' and preferences." The one thing neither side disputed
was that the wording had been a decisive factor in the electoral
outcome.13
The impact of framing, moreover, is not limited to the
phenomenon of question wording effects. Those who write
initiatives control the political menu, and thereby shape voter
choice. Voters may prefer a particular initiative to the status
8.
9.
10.
Nov. 27,
11.
1998, at
12.

CHAVEZ, supra note 7; for poll results, see id. at 20, 99, 104, 106.
Id. at 247.
Julie Mason, Court Backs PropositionA Ballot Wording, HOUSTON CHRONICLE,
1997, at Al.
Ron Nissimov, Judge Rejects Last Fall's Vote, HOUSTON CHRONICLE, June 27,
Al.
Ron Nissimov, Judge Shies at Revising Ballot on Affirmative Action Herself,

HOUSTON CHRONICLE, August 14, 1998, at A37.

13. Ron Nissimov, Affirmative Action Ruling is Overturned, HOUSTON CHRONICLE,
December 22, 1999, at Al.
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quo, yet given a wider range of options they may rank that
initiative near the bottom. Given a choice between approving or
rejecting Measure A, voters may prefer Measure A, but given a
choice between Measures A and B they may opt for Measure B
and reject Measure A. Take term limits. During the 1990s voters
in many states approved strict term limits laws that included
lifetime bans. Faced with a choice between no term limits and
highly restrictive term limits, voters generally favored
restrictive term limits. But voters may not have made the same
decision if they had been offered a choice between a term limits
measure with a lifetime ban and a term limits measure that
allowed legislators to return to office after a specified number of
years. The power to determine the choices on the ballot carries
with it the power to shape the outcome.
Tax-cutting initiatives provide another telling illustration of
this same phenomenon. In Oregon in 1996, voters were offered
Measure 47, which dramatically rolled back property taxes. One
critic complained that the measure was like "killing an ant with
a bazooka." The problem, as the reporter pointed out, is that for
taxpayers "a bazooka is the only weapon at their disposal at the
moment. ' 14 Voters were offered the choice between a large
rollback in taxes or no change in their taxes. They were not
allowed to choose between a large and a more moderate rollback,
or between the proposed measure and a system of rebates for
low-income or fixed-income property owners. Nor was the
alternative of differential tax rates for business and homeowners
put to the voters. So while the vote on Measure 47 reflected the
majority's preference for lower property taxes (52 percent
supported the measure), the precise policies (the extent of the
reduction and the restrictions on future increases, the limits on
new bonds and replacement fees, and the requirement that
property tax levies achieve a 50 percent turnout rate) that were
enacted did not reflect the will of the voters so much as the will
of the measure's author, Bill Sizemore. 15
A further reason that voters' approval of an initiative
cannot erase concerns about the measure's sponsor is that
passage by itself reveals nothing about the issue's salience to
voters. In 1996, for example, affirmative action ranked near the
bottom of the list of issues that most concerned Californians.
14. James Mayer, The Property Tax Puzzle: Will Measure 47 Make Oregon's System
More Fair?,OREGONIAN, Sept. 23, 1996, at A8.
15. Id. Measure 47 was helped by the arrival of property tax bills in mailboxes only
days before ballots and voter guides arrived in the mail.
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Citizens expressed far greater concern about jobs, education, the
environment, and taxes. 16 In 2000, as in other recent elections,
anti-tax initiatives dominated state ballots - appearing in
Alaska, California, Colorado, Massachusetts, Oregon, South
Dakota, and Washington 17 - even though polls consistently
showed that voters were far less concerned with reducing taxes
8
than with improving the quality of government services.'
Candidates for office tend to be much more responsive to the
issues that matter most to voters than are initiative advocates,
for whom there is little or no incentive to select issues that are
salient to voters. Candidates, unlike initiative activists, must
seek out issues that are not only popular but that matter to
ordinary voters.
The diminished salience of tax issues to voters was reflected
in the defeat of a number of anti-tax initiatives in 2000,
including Alaska's Measure 4, which would have capped

16. CHAVEZ, supra note 7, at 118, 160.
17. Had it not been for the courts there would have been two additional anti-tax
initiatives on the ballot, both radical, one in Arizona, the other in Arkansas. Arizona's
Taxpayer Protection Act of 2000, which would have eliminated the state's income tax
over four years, require public votes on new state taxes, and allow candidates for federal
office to include ballot notations next to their name indicating that they pledge to
eliminate the federal income tax, was thrown off the ballot in August for violating the
single-subject rule. Two weeks before the election, the Arkansas Supreme Court struck
down Amendment 4, which would have repealed the state sales tax on used goods and
require public votes on future tax increases. See Kurrus v. Priest, 29 S.W.3d 669 (2000).
The ballot title, the court argued, failed to inform voters "of the far-reaching
consequences of voting for this measure." In particular, the court faulted the title for not
making it clear to voters that "by approving this measure, he or she may risk losing
valuable government services." Id. at 674. Moreover, the court faulted the ballot title for
failing to define clearly what counts as a "tax increase" and what counts as "a regularly
scheduled statewide election," so that the voter could not know for certain what acts
would trigger the voter approval provision and when those votes would take place.
According to the court, "the ultimate issue is whether the voter, while inside the voting
booth, is able to reach an intelligent and informed decision for or against the proposal
and understands the consequences of his or her vote based on the ballot title." Id. at
672. One can agree with the court about the importance of voters making informed
decisions; that is the reason we have campaigns. It is less clear, though, that the decision
about whether voters are capable of making informed decisions should be left to judges.
18. In 1980, for example, 62 percent of Americans agreed that Washington "ought
to cut taxes even if it means putting off some important things that need to be done." In
1999, only 21 percent agreed with this statement. LOS ANGELES TIMES polls conducted in
2000 showed that voters by nearly a 3 to 1 margin preferred to use government
surpluses for Social Security, Medicare or debt reduction rather than tax cuts. See Peter
G. Gosselin, Tax Cuts Seen as Spoiler in Boom Times, LOS ANGELES TIMES, August 26,
2000, at Al; see also Jeff Mapes and Harry Esteve; Healthy Economy Cools Oregon TaxCutting Fever, OREGONIAN, September 24, 2000, at Al; BRENT STEEL & ROBERT SAHR,
OREGON GOVERNMENTAL ISSUES SuRVEY-2000 (Program for Governmental Research and
Education, Oregon State University, July 2000) (on file with the author).
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property taxes, California's
Proposition 37, Colorado's
Amendment 21, and Measures 91 and 93 in Oregon. But the
presence of these initiatives on the ballot forced political officials
and interest groups to play defense on the question of taxes.
Thus, even when they lose the electoral battle, initiative
activists may win the political war by controlling the agenda.
Although six of Sizemore's initiatives in 2000 lost, for example,
he still managed to dictate Oregon's political agenda by forcing
the state's political leaders to react to his agenda rather than to
define their own. In the 1998 gubernatorial election Governor
Kitzhaber had unceremoniously trounced candidate Sizemore by
a better than two-to-one margin, yet within little more than a
year Kitzhaber felt compelled to challenge his defeated opponent
to a series of debates about Sizemore's billion dollar tax cut
proposal. Moreover, Kitzhaber scaled back his own initiative
plans, which included establishing a rainy day fund for schools,
so that he could concentrate his campaigning and fund-raising
efforts on defeating Sizemore's tax proposals. The cost to the
state of enacting a reckless anti-tax measure, Kitzhaber and his
allies calculated, outweighed the potential benefit that might be
gained by passing his own set of education initiatives.
Labor unions have experienced similar frustrations. They
have been forced to raise millions of dollars in California and
Oregon in 1998, and again in Oregon in 2000, to fight initiatives
designed to limit their ability to contribute money to political
campaigns. 19 Although all of these measures failed at the ballot
box, they succeeded in placing the unions on the defensive,
diverting valuable resources away from candidate elections and
from the unions' own agenda. In 2000, labor unions in Oregon
gave about two million dollars to state legislative candidates,
less than half of what they spent to defeat Sizemore's two antiunion measures (Measures 92 and 98). Partly as a result, the
gap in Oregon between labor and business spending on
candidate races grew from less than two-to-one in 1998 to nearly
three-to-one in 2000.20 Moreover, the unions decided not to
pursue a number of initiative petitions that they had submitted
to the Secretary of State, including: the Minimum Wage
Protection Act of 2000, which would have required that the
19. The story of the 1998 battle over Proposition 226 (the Paycheck Protection Act)
in California is well told David Broder. See DAVID S. BRODER, DEMOCRACY DERAILED,
113-14, 118 (2000) (note chapter 3: "Initiative War in Close-Up").
20. Dave Hogan & Steve Suo, Campaign Spending Heads Into Record Territory,
OREGONIAN,

October 23, 2000, at Al.
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state's minimum wage be automatically adjusted for inflation;
the Workplace Safety and Workers' Compensation Fairness Act,
which would have made it easier for workers to receive workers'
compensation benefits; a Patients' Bill of Rights; and a State
Purchases of Products Made with Child Labor Act, prohibiting
the state from buying from vendors who employ children under
age fourteen. 21 Diverting unions' attention from their own
agenda was arguably the primary objective of Sizemore's antiunion initiatives. As Sizemore assistant Becky Miller exulted
after the election, "Imagine the mischief [the unions] could have
done in Oregon if they had had that money to spend on
something else .... They were completely tied up trying to play
22
defense and were not able to play offense."
In short, it does matter how initiatives get onto the ballot
and who puts them there. The populist platitude that "the
initiative process belongs to the people" 23 is an effort to scare us
away from asking hard, searching questions about the signature
gathering process and its connection to democratic ideals.
II. THE PURPOSE AND VARIETY OF SIGNATURE REQUIREMENTS
All states require initiative petitioners to obtain a number
of signatures before they can place a measure on the ballot. The
primary purpose of signature requirements is to ensure that
initiatives that reach the ballot meet a minimum threshold of
public support. States vary considerably in where they set the
threshold, but no state has ever dispensed with the threshold.
Without a signature requirement, voters would almost certainly
be inundated with a flood of frivolous or idiosyncratic measures.
Every irate citizen with a pet peeve and a little energy could
force their obsession upon the voters. Set the signature hurdle
too high, however, and committed citizens with genuine, widely
shared grievances would be prevented from bringing their issue
directly before the people.
The highest signature threshold for a statutory initiative
exists in Wyoming, which requires the number of valid
signatures to be at least 15 percent of the total number of votes
21. Initiative, Referendum, and Referral Log, Elections Division, Oregon Secretary
of State, available at http://sos-venus.sos.state.or.us:8080/elec-srch/web-irr-search.
search-form.
22. Quoted in Dave Hogan & Harry Esteve, Unions Enjoy Election Victories,
OREGONIAN, Nov. 12, 2000, at B4.
23. Bill Sizemore, quoted in David Postman, Legislators Try to Limit Initiatives
That Try to Limit Them, SEATTLE TIMES, July 19, 1999, at Al.
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cast in the preceding general election. Much more lenient is
North Dakota, where petitioners only need to gather the
signatures of two percent of the resident population (calculated
on the basis of the last federal census) to place a statutory
initiative on the ballot. 24 In the vast majority of states, the
signature requirement for statutory initiatives ranges between
five and ten percent, usually calculated as a percentage of the
number of votes cast in the last gubernatorial election. 25 In
Montana, for instance, the number is five percent of the number
26
of votes cast for governor.
Typically the number of signatures required to get a
constitutional amendment on the ballot is greater, though how
much greater varies by state. In Montana the number of
signatures required for a constitutional amendment is twice
what it is for statutes, which is one of the largest spreads in the
27
country and a valuable disincentive to constitutional tinkering.
In Oregon, in contrast, the difference between statutory changes
and constitutional amendments is only the difference between
six and eight percent, which encourages activists to cast their
political demands as constitutional changes. Between 1990 and
2000 nearly sixty percent of the 74 initiatives that qualified for
the ballot in Oregon were crafted as constitutional amendments.
In contrast, in Montana, only a quarter of the 44 initiatives that
have been on the ballot in the thirty years since the 1972
constitution was enacted have been constitutional amendments
(prior to 1972, constitutional initiatives were not permitted).
States also differ in the length of time they allow petitioners
to gather signatures for initiative petitions: in Oklahoma they
have only 90 days and in California 150 days, while Montana
petitioners have one year, and in Oregon they have two years,
and four years in Florida. Three quarters of the states give
petitioners at least a year to gather signatures for an initiative.
24. Although texts on the initiative and referendum routinely list North Dakota as
the state with the most lenient signature requirement, the state's two percent
requirement is roughly equivalent to a requirement that signatures be equal to five
percent of the votes in the previous gubernatorial contest. For instance South Dakota,
which sets a five percent threshold for statutes and has a population of about 700,000,
required 13,010 signatures in 2000, while North Dakota, which counted 638,000 people
in the 1990 census, required 12,776 signatures. By a very slight margin, then, North
Dakota's requirement was actually more burdensome than South Dakota's.
25.
DuBoiS & FEENEY, supra note 4, at 33-34; DAVID MAGLEBY, DIRECT
LEGISLATION: VOTING ON BALLOT PROPOSITIONS IN THE UNITED STATES 38-40 (1984).

26.
27.

See infra text accompanying note 28.
Compare MONT. CONST. art XIV, § 9, cl. 1, with MONT. CONST. art. III, § 4, cl.
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Half of the initiative states also require that signatures
must meet some kind of geographical distribution requirement,
the aim of which is to prevent petitioners from obtaining all
their signatures in a few heavily populated urban areas. In
Montana, for instance, prior to November 2002, a proposed
statutory initiative not only had to receive signatures equal to 5
percent of the number who voted in the last preceding
gubernatorial election, but also had to achieve that 5 percent
threshold in 34 of the 100 legislative districts. 28 In November,
Montana voters approved a legislative referral that stiffened
this requirement by requiring petitioners to reach the 5 percent
threshold in at least half of the state's 56 counties. None of the
high use initiative states - Oregon, California, Arizona,
Colorado, and Washington - have a geographic distribution
requirement, which is not a coincidence since geographic
distribution requirements tend to make qualifying an initiative
more difficult and expensive.
Adding to the variation in the signature gathering
experience are the tremendous differences in state size. In
California, for instance, the five percent signature threshold for
a statutory initiative meant that initiative petitioners had to
obtain 420,000 signatures to place an issue on the ballot in 2000.
The same five percent requirement in Montana required
petitioners to gather only about 20,000 signatures. Thus even
though both California and Montana have adopted an identical
five percent signature threshold calculated on the basis of votes
cast in the last gubernatorial election, size alone makes the
signature gatherers' task in the two states different in kind.
Because of its size, petitioners in California have long been
heavily reliant on professional signature gatherers, whereas in
states like Montana, South Dakota and North Dakota
petitioners traditionally have not needed to hire paid signature
gatherers to qualify a measure. A study done by David Schmidt
in 1984 found that in California and Ohio, the two most
populous initiative states during this period, 29 only fifteen
percent of the initiatives that appeared on the ballot between
1980 and 1984 had been qualified by signature drives that had
used volunteers to gather at least ninety percent of the requisite
signatures. In contrast, in the other initiative states, more than
28.

MONT. CONST. art. III, § 4, cl. 2.

29. This does not count Illinois, which though it has marginally more people than
Ohio, has had only one initiative in its history. Florida, which today is the second most
populous initiative state, had no initiatives during the period Schmidt studied.

https://scholarworks.umt.edu/mlr/vol64/iss1/4

12

2003Ellis:
SIGNATURE
GATHERING
IN THE Process:
INITIATIVE
PROCESS Is It? 47
Signature Gathering
in the Initiative
How Democratic
eighty percent of the initiatives that reached the ballot had
relied on volunteers to gather at least ninety percent of the
signatures. And of the ten initiative states with populations
under 2 million, more than 85 percent of initiative campaigns
during this period relied on volunteers to gather at least ninety
percent of the signatures. Only two of Montana's ten initiatives
30
in that period used paid petitioners.
III. A BRIEF HISTORY OF SIGNATURE REQUIREMENTS
Schmidt's 1984 study seemed to vindicate the grassroots
character of most initiative campaigns. According to Schmidt,
only about one quarter of all statewide initiatives between 1980
and 1984 relied on professional circulators to garner more than
one-third of the required signatures; and about two-thirds used
volunteers to amass more than ninety percent of the signatures.
In the early 1980s, then, most initiative campaigns apparently
still relied on a large number of dedicated volunteers, people
who were working to get the measure on the ballot because they
believed in the issue not because they were being paid. Plenty of
initiatives relied heavily and even exclusively on paid
petitioners, but outside of the most populous states like
California, Ohio, and Michigan these remained a distinct

minority. 31
In a few states, the reliance on volunteers during the early
1980s was a product not of choice but of law. Oregon had
outlawed paid petitioners in 1935, and it was not until a 1982
32
district court decision that the state's ban was invalidated.

30. David Schmidt, Studies Show Initiatives are Nonpartisan,Grassroots Politics,
INITIATIVE NEWS REPORT, Nov. 30, 1984, at 1-2, 5-9. Alaska accounted for close to half of
the campaigns in small states that relied on paid signature gatherers for more than 10
percent of the signatures.
31. Id. at2.
32. Libertarian Party of Oregon v. Paulus, Civ. No. 82-521FR, slip op. at 4 (D. Or.
Sept. 3, 1982). The case was brought by the Libertarian party, which wanted to use paid
petitioners to collect the signatures required to qualify the party's candidates for the
ballot. U.S. District Court Judge Helen Frye ruled that Oregon's ban on paid signature
gatherers was an unconstitutional restriction on the Libertarian party's right of free
speech. Although Frye's decision did not specifically address ballot measures, it was
widely assumed that the ruling applied to initiative and referenda as well, and so the
Oregon legislature responded the following year by dropping its longstanding ban on
paid canvassers in initiative and referendum elections. In 1984, after a federal judge
upheld Colorado's ban on paid petitioners in a case dealing specifically with an initiative
(See Grant v. Meyer, 741 F.2d 1210 (10 th Cir. 1984) (discussing the district court's
action)), Oregon's Secretary of State Norma Paulus spearheaded an effort to reinstate
the ban on paid signature gatherers for ballot measure campaigns only. The bill passed
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Colorado's ban on paid petitioners, enacted in 1941, remained in
place until the U.S. Supreme Court ruled, in Meyer v. Grant,
that the ban was unconstitutional because it restricted free
speech. 33 The Supreme Court's decision in Meyer also effectively
nullified Washington's longstanding ban on paid signature
gatherers. 34 In 1993 the Washington state legislature responded
to Meyer by modifying its ban to prohibit only the method of
paying per signature, leaving initiative campaigns free to pay by
the hour. But even this more limited ban on paid signature
gatherers was struck down in federal court on free speech
grounds. 35 The courts had turned the law on its head. Prior to
the 1980s, no federal or state court in the United States had
found a ban on paid petitioners to be unconstitutional. In 1973,
for instance, both the Washington Supreme Court and the
Oregon Supreme Court emphatically rejected the view that a
ban on paid petitioners was unconstitutional. 36 Up until the
1980s, banning paid petitioners, like myriad other state
regulations of the initiative process, was widely seen as
something best left to the legislature and to the people of a

by better than a two-to-one margin in the Oregon House in 1985 but died in the Senate.
The measure resurfaced in the next legislative session, and again passed the House by a
large margin and failed in the Senate.
33. Meyer v. Grant, 486 U.S. 414 (1988). The ban was modified by a 1983 Colorado
Supreme Court decision, which struck the word "inducement" from the statute that had
banned "direct or indirect payment in consideration of or as an inducement to circulation
of a petition." Urevich v. Woodward, 667 P.2d 760, 764 (1983). That decision stemmed
from a suit filed by the Association of Community Organizations for Reform Now
(ACORN), which in 1982 had tried to qualify an initiative for the ballot and had
requested that petition circulators collect financial donations at the same time they
sought ballot signatures. The circulators were offered 30 to 40 percent of the
contributions they collected. A Denver district judge said ACORN violated the ban on
paid circulators, but the Supreme Court both reversed the decision-arguing that
"ACORN's method falls outside the statute, because its solicitors are not paid in
consideration of circulating the petition, but rather in consideration of the financial
contributions they solicit"- and struck the term "inducement" as overly broad. Id. at
761; see also UPI wire report (July 18, 1983).
34. Meyer also nullified a short-lived ban on paid signature gatherers in Nebraska,
which had been enacted earlier in the 1980s.
35. See LIMIT v. Maleng, 874 F. Supp. 1138 (1994).
36. See Washington v. Conifer Enters, 508 P.2d 149, 153 (1973); Oregon v.
Campbell, 506 P.2d 163 (1973). The first time a court struck down a state restriction on
paid circulators came in 1976, when the California Supreme Court invalidated a law
(enacted as part of the Political Reform Act of 1974, which was passed by initiative)
limiting expenditures on behalf of an initiative to no more than 25 cents a signature.
Hardie v. March Fong Eu, 556 P.2d 301 (1976). In reaching its decision, the California
court explicitly followed the U.S. Supreme Court's landmark ruling on campaign finance,
Buckley v Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976), which was issued earlier that year. The Buckley case
is discussed in greater depth later in this chapter.
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particular state.
That a number of states long ago took the trouble to ban
paid petitioners tips us off to a simple, often forgotten fact:
namely, paid petitioners are as old as the initiative process
itself. In Oregon, for instance, paid petitioners were used to
qualify all of the state's most famous good government
measures, including the direct primary law passed in 1904, the
Corrupt Practices Act passed in 1908, and the presidential
primary bill of 1912, as well as the constitutional initiative in
1906 that established the initiative and referendum for
localities, and the 1908 constitutional initiative that permitted
the recall of public officials. 37 As the Supreme Court of Oregon
observed in 1912, "it is difficult to find citizens who are so
devoted to their principles as to be willing to circulate such
petitions without compensation."38 A study of the Oregon
initiative process published in 1915 concluded that while
"[pletitions for some measures have been circulated wholly by
volunteers.. .such cases have been comparatively few." 39 Even in
the initiative's infancy
there were already frequent and
disparaging references made to the "industry" of "petition
peddling." And the business could be a lucrative one for those
gathering signatures. Signature gatherers in 1910 could expect
about 5 cents a signature (equivalent to roughly 80 cents in 2000
dollars), or if, as often happened, they were carrying multiple
measures at the same time, their rate might be dropped to closer
to three or three-and-a-half cents a signature. As the deadline
for submitting the signatures neared, however, the price per
40
signature could climb as high as ten cents or more.
The concerns and anxieties expressed about paid petitioners
in the early twentieth century are similar to the ones we often
hear today. "Any person with sufficient money," worried the
Eugene Register in 1913, "knows that he can get any kind of
legislation on the ballot."41 In 1908, the Oregonian had lodged
the same objection: "the man or group of men who have money
to spend, and who are willing to spend it, can secure submission
of any measure to a vote of the people." Enlisting "the voluntary
service of people in circulating petitions," the Oregonian
37.
JAMES BARNETT, THE OPERATION OF THE INITIATIVE, REFERENDUM,
RECALL IN OREGON 59-60 (1915).

38.
39.
40.
41.

AND

State v. Olott, 125 P. 303, 306 (1912).
Barnett, supra note 37, at 59.
Id. at 60.
Id. at 61.
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reasoned, was the only reliable way of determining whether "a
measure is... of sufficient importance and public interest" that it
should be brought before the people. Paying signature gatherers
effectively gutted the purpose of requiring signatures in the first
place. 42 To Republican Senator Jonathan Bourne, a primary
problem with paid petitioners was that they choked out the
grassroots: "while paid circulation of petitions is the universal
custom, there will be few volunteers, for most people will either
decline to work without pay while others are paid, or will
hesitate to put themselves in the class of paid workers. '43 Paying
petitioners degraded the signature gatherer - it became seen as
a sales job rather than as the precious province of the publicspirited citizen. Knowing they can pay their way onto the ballot,
groups do not even attempt the hard political work of mobilizing
a dedicated band of citizens. Payment for signatures simplifies
the job of the initiative's sponsors, but at the price of
attenuating civic involvement in the political process.
Sentiments such as these, together with concerns about
outright fraud and corruption in the signature gathering
process, led to a number of early attempts to ban paid
petitioners, some of them successful. A bill to ban paid
petitioners was introduced in Oregon as early as 1909." Similar
laws were introduced in legislatures across the nation, including
Washington, South Dakota, and Ohio, where such bans were
enacted into law between 1913 and 1914. Most states, though,
declined to ban paid petitioners, although spectacular cases of
fraud, or concerns about the control of special interests
sporadically forced the issue onto the legislative agenda. In
California, for instance, bills to ban paid petitioners were
introduced and defeated in 1915, 1917, 1937, 1939, 1953, 1959,
1963, 1965, 1969, 1973, and again in 1987. 45 Banning paid
petitioners, opponents warned, would advantage firms that
employed large numbers of people and would make it impossible
for all but the most popular causes to exercise the right of direct
democracy. "Most of these proposals," political scientists V. 0.
Key and Winston Crouch wryly observed in 1939, "come from
that idyllic school of political thought which holds that the
42.
43.
44.

Barnett, supra note 37, at 62.
Id. at 63.
Id. at 62.

45.

PHILIP L.

DuBois AND FLOYD

F.

INITIATIVE PROCESS: OPTIONS FOR CHANGE
Research Report, 1992).
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political wheels should go round, like the perpetual machine,
'46
without money.
Fears that a ban on paid petitioners would cripple the
initiative process were particularly acute in California. In 1912,
the first year in which the tools of direct legislation were made
available to Californians, the State Federation of Labor reported
that obtaining the required number of signatures had "proved no
easy undertaking." "Depending upon volunteer work alone," the
Federation found, "has proven to be very unsatisfactory." 4 7 Each
of the successful initiatives in California's first initiative election
relied heavily on paid signature gatherers. Over the next six
decades, just one initiative qualified for the ballot in California
using only volunteers, a 1938 measure that promised voters a
number of benefits including improved pensions. California's
decision in 1966 to reduce the percentage of required signatures
for a statutory initiative from eight to five percent increased the
importance of volunteer efforts in California's initiative
process, 48 but the effect was short-lived. Volunteer signature
campaigns played a prominent, even predominant, role in a
substantial number of high profile initiatives during the 1970s,
including the landmark Proposition 13 in 1978. But since 1982
few California initiatives have relied on volunteers for the bulk
of the signatures, and it has been the very rare exception that
has not used paid signature gatherers. The last volunteer-only
initiative in California was a 1990 measure that outlawed the
49
hunting of mountain lions.

46.

V.O. KEY, JR. AND WINSTON W. CROUCH, THE INITIATIVE AND REFERENDUM IN

CALIFORNIA 562, 546-47 (1939).
47. Proceedings of the Thirteenth Annual Convention of the California State
Federation of Labor, October 7-12, 1912, p. 91, in CHARLENE WEAR SIMMONS,
CALIFORNIA'S STATEWIDE INITIATIVE PROCESS 7 (California Research Bureau, 1997).
48. Prior to 1966 California had an indirect initiative option that required only 5
percent of signatures. The option was little used and voters approved abolition of the
indirect initiative at the same time they lowered the number of signatures for direct
statutory initiative, as recommended by a constitutional revision commission.
49.
See CALIFORNIA COMMISSION ON CAMPAIGN FINANCING, DEMOCRACY BY
INITIATIVE: SHAPING CALIFORNIA'S FOURTH BRANCH OF GOVERNMENT 146 (Center for
Responsive Government, 1992) [hereinafter CALIFORNIA COMMISSION]; SIMMONS, supra
note 47, at 9; PETER SCHRAG, PARADISE LOST: CALIFORNIA'S EXPERIENCE, AMERICA'S

FUTURE 210 (1998). The mountain lion sponsors experimented with using direct mail
solicitations that included signature petitions and fund-raising appeals, but found that
combining signature collection with fund-raising was not an effective way either to
gather signatures or to raise money. Eleven organizers were hired to coordinate the work
of the army of volunteer signature gatherers, some of whom devoted the entire summer
of 1989 to circulating petitions. See William M. Lunch & Wesley Jamison, The Lab Rat
That Roared: The Mountain Lion Initiative in California and the Animal Rights
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IV. THE DECLINE OF THE VOLUNTEER AND RISE OF THE
PROFESSIONAL

California's reliance on paid petitioners today is hardly
surprising given the state's size and the relatively short period
in which circulators are permitted to gather signatures. It is by
far the most populous state in the union, and its 150 day
window for circulating direct initiative petitions is the second
most restrictive in the nation. The more dramatic story of the
past two decades is the change that has occurred in many
medium-sized and small initiative states. In Idaho, for instance,
which up until 1998 allowed petitioners two years to circulate a
petition, paid petitioners were virtually unknown in the postwar era. In the half century prior to 1994, none of the twelve
initiatives that made it to the ballot used paid petitioners. In
1994, however, both initiatives that appeared on the ballot - the
first establishing term limits for elected officials, the second
establishing state policies regarding homosexuality - used paid
petitioners. In 1996 and 1998 five more initiatives appeared on
the ballot, each of them relying on paid signature gatherers to a
greater or lesser degree. Virtually overnight the practice of
signature gathering in Idaho had been transformed from almost
exclusive reliance on volunteers to a heavy reliance on paid
50
signature gatherers.
Most states do a poor job tracking whether initiatives rely
on paid signature gatherers. Only a handful of states require
petitioners to indicate whether they plan to use paid petitioners,
and these requirements have generally been enacted so recently
that useful data is not yet available. A pioneering exception is
the state of Oregon, which for over a decade has mandated chief
petitioners to indicate whether they will use paid petitioners in
the signature gathering process. Thus in Oregon it is possible to
document precisely the growth in the number of paid petitioners
over the last decade. Moreover, since Oregon requires this
information to be submitted before signature gathering has

Movement in the Nation 9-11(March 1992) (unpublished paper prepared for delivery at
the Annual Meeting of the Western Political Science Association, San Francisco, Ca., on
file with the author).
50. E-mail from Penny Ysursa, Administrative Secretary, Election Division, Office
of the Secretary of State, Idaho, to the Author (October 18, 1999); Kevin Richert,
Signature-for-hire Businesses Fueling Idaho Ballot Initiatives, IDAHO FALLS POST
REGISTER, December 7, 1995, at Al; Marty Trillhaase, Initiative Drives Get Costlier,
IDAHO STATESMAN, June 18, 1996, at Al; Marty Trillhaase, Recognizing an Era Has
Passed, IDAHO FALLS POST REGISTER, February 11, 1997, at A10.
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begun, reliance on paid signature gatherers can even be
examined among the initiative campaigns that failed to gather
the requisite number of signatures.
The number of initiatives in Oregon that rely entirely on
volunteers to gather signatures has not changed appreciably
since 1988, while the number of initiatives relying on paid
petitioners has increased dramatically. In 1988 a majority of the
initiatives circulating were volunteer-only, whereas between
1994 and 1998 there were twice as many initiatives using paid
petitioners as there were using only volunteers. In 2000 and
2002, there were four times as many initiatives using paid
signature gatherers. However, the big difference between
volunteer-only petitions and paid petitioners is demonstrated by
their success rates in qualifying for the ballot. Between 1988
and 2002, little better than 1 in 10 volunteer-only efforts made it
to the ballot. Since 1996 only three volunteer-only initiatives
have qualified for the ballot, and one of these, a vote-by-mail
initiative, was spearheaded by the Secretary of State and other
government officials. In contrast, about 40 percent of initiatives
that relied at least partly on paid petitioners have made it to the
ballot since 1996. Over the last four elections (1996 to 2002), 94
percent of the initiatives on the Oregon ballot have used paid
petitioners.
The impact of paid petitioners on the success of a
qualification campaign is understated by these numbers,
dramatic as they are. Petitioners who indicated an intention to
pay for signatures, but failed to make it to the ballot, generally
were unable to raise the money to make it possible for them to
pay signature gatherers. Among the groups for whom money
presented no obstacle, the success rate in qualifying for the
ballot approached one hundred percent. Overwhelmingly, groups
in Oregon that had the money to pay petitioners gained access to
the ballot, while groups that did not have the money to pay
petitioners found gaining access to the ballot extraordinarily
burdensome.
In the neighboring state of Washington, the story is similar.
The only initiative to appear on the ballot in 1994, a measure
allowing denture makers to sell dentures directly to the public
rather than to dentists, spent roughly three times as much as
any other initiative campaign. It was also the only initiative
campaign willing to violate the 1993 state law prohibiting
payment per signature. The other nine active signaturegathering campaigns, which included measures relating to gay
Published by ScholarWorks at University of Montana, 2003
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rights, abortion, welfare reform, criminal punishment, and
legislative ethics, relied entirely on volunteers and each failed to
gather the necessary signatures. Sherry Bockwinkel, whose
signature gathering firm gathered most of the signatures for the
denturists, admitted that "there isn't a chance in the world a

volunteer effort is going to make

it."51

The following year

Bockwinkel's firm, Washington Initiatives Now (WIN), was
hired to qualify two initiative campaigns, one relating to
commercial fishing regulations and the other to casino gambling
on Indian reservations. Bockwinkel publicly boasted, "I can
guarantee we'll be on the ballot ....I've got the key to the
ballot."52 And Bockwinkel was as good as her word: both
measures qualified; indeed they were the only direct initiatives
among the 17 filed that qualified for the ballot that year. Not
coincidentally, they were also the only two to use paid signature
gatherers. "You have to pay to play," is Bockwinkel's catchy
53
slogan.
notwithstanding,
and
bravado
Bockwinkel's
boast
when
an
issue captures
efforts
are
still
possible
volunteer-only
the imagination of citizens and activists, as the 1998 and 1999
Washington elections showed in spectacular fashion. In 1998
two of the four ballot measures qualified without the use of paid
signatures. The first, a ban on partial-birth abortions, gathered
the needed signatures in only six weeks and benefited from one
of the highest validation rates in state history - a remarkable 90
percent of its signatures were deemed valid. The second, a hike
in the minimum wage, exceeded the 180,000 signature target by
better than 50,000. 54 An even more spectacular refutation of
51. Patti Epler, Illegalities Won't Stop Initiative; Denturists' Measure Likely to Be
Only One on Fall Ballot, NEWS TRIBUNE (Tacoma, Wash.), June 30, 1994, at Al; see also
Kathy George, State's Citizens May Have Too Much Initiative, SEATTLE POSTINTELLIGENCER, July 7, 1994, at Al.

52. Joseph Turner, Fall Ballot Likely to List 2 Initiatives, NEWS TRIBUNE (Tacoma,
Wash.), June 26, 1995, at B1.
53. Kimberly Mills, The Name Game: Initiative Processat Its Best with a Volunteer
Effort, SEATTLE POST-INTELLIGENCER, July 23, 1995, at El. Cite checkers, find these
articles and let me know if I need to split this cite.
54. Joseph Turner, Abortion Issue Likely on Ballot, NEWS TRIBUNE (Tacoma,
Wash.) , July 2, 1998, at B1; Hunter T. George, Initiative Campaigns Succeed Without
Paid Signature Gatherers, COLUMBIAN (Vancouver, Wash.), July 2, 1998, at B2; Susan
Gilmore, Abortion Initiative to Be on Ballot in November, SEATTLE TIMES, July 27 1998,
at B1.Even as these volunteer efforts were succeeding quite comfortably, Rob Killian, a
Tacoma physician who paid for every signature gathered for the medical marijuana
measure, told reporters, "I don't know anyone who can get anything on the ballot
Hal Spencer, Marijuana, Wage
anymore just with volunteer signature-gatherers."
Initiatives on Track, COLUMBIAN (Vancouver, Wash.), June 2, 1998, at B5.
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Bockwinkel's slogan came in 1999 when 1-695, which proposed
to roll back Washington's motor vehicle tax and require voter
approval for any tax or fee increase by state or local government,
qualified without the use of paid signature gatherers. In fact,
the initiative gathered close to 400,000 valid signatures, more
than double the number of signatures required, and the second
highest total in Washington history. 55 A number of other
volunteer-only drives succeeded in the 1990s, including a 1996
measure orchestrated by the Humane Society that banned bear
and cougar hunting using dogs or bait, a measure similar to
ones the Humane Society had qualified using volunteers in
Oregon in 1994 and California in 1990. Also noteworthy were
the 230,000 signatures gathered by volunteers for a popular
referendum on a controversial property rights law enacted by
the state legislature in 1995. That number was well over twice
the 90,834 signatures the petitioners needed, and was gathered
within the 90 days allowed for a referendum petition. 56 Not all
issues, then, have to pay to play.
Still, of the thirty initiatives that reached the ballot in
Washington between 1992 and 2000, only six secured their spot
without paid signature gatherers: a 1993 anti-tax measure, the
1996 hunting ban, the 1998 partial-birth ban and the minimum
wage increase, the 1999 repeal of the motor vehicle tax, and, in
2000, another Humane Society measure banning certain animal
traps and poisons. Considering that prior to 1991 no initiative
campaign in Washington had used paid signature gatherers, the
practice having been outlawed in the early twentieth century,
the transformation is remarkable. Ironically, the first
Washington initiative campaign to employ professional
signature gatherers, after the longstanding ban was invalidated,
was a 1991 term limits measure, the aim of which was to throw
professional politicians out of the legislature and to allow
amateurs and ordinary citizens a chance to volunteer for public
service. In fact, every term limits measure that has qualified for
the ballot in the United States has done so primarily and often
exclusively through utilizing professional signature gatherers.

55. The most signatures in Washington history were gathered in a 1973 initiative
campaign to roll back and cap legislative salaries. Riding a tidal wave of popular outrage
against a legislative pay raise that had tripled legislators' salaries from $3,600 to
$10,650 a year. A furniture salesman and political novice, Bruce Helm, spearheaded a
volunteer effort that needed only two weeks to collect almost 700,000 signatures. Mills,
supra note 53.
56. Mills, supra note 53.
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The rapid transformation in Washington from volunteer to
professional signature gatherers has been replicated with
similar speed in Colorado, a state with at least a million fewer
people and a substantially lower signature threshold. In 1998,
initiative sponsors in Washington needed to gather just under
180,000 signatures, while initiative proponents in Colorado
needed less than one third that many. Yet despite the relatively
low number of signatures required in Colorado (during the
1990s, initiative petitions needed around 50,000 in a state of
well over three million people), the lack of any geographical
distribution requirement, and the absence of a tradition of
paying for signatures (prior to the 1988 Meyer decision, the
practice had been forbidden for almost half a century), the
Colorado ballot in the 1990s was monopolized with measures
using paid signature gatherers. Between 1990 and 1996 only one
of the 31 measures (a bear trapping measure) reached the ballot
without paying for signatures, though several (like a 1996
campaign finance reform measure) used volunteers extensively.
Initiative activists were quick to proclaim that paid signature
gatherers were the only way to reach the ballot. Jim Klodinski,
an organizer of a 1994 gambling initiative, justified his
measure's reliance on paid signature gatherers by insisting, "If
you think you're going to get something on the ballot without
paid professionals, you're crazy."57 Similarly sweeping was
another initiative activist's assurance that "it is impossible in
58
Colorado to qualify a petition without using paid circulators."
The activists' exaggerated claims are belied, however, by the
success of the Colorado Pro-Life Alliance in using only
volunteers to qualify not one but two initiatives for the 1998
ballot: the first requiring parental notification before a minor
can obtain an abortion, and the second banning late-term
abortions. 59 Calling on "God's people to take a stand for God's
righteousness and against abortion," a dedicated cadre of
roughly 200 volunteers collected signatures outside churches, at
Christian concerts and in other venues where God's people were

57. Burt Hubbard, Big Bucks Buy Spot on Ballot, DENVER ROCKY MOUNTAIN
NEWS, Aug. 7, 1994, at A4.
58. Elizabeth Garrett, Money, Agenda Setting and Direct Democracy, 77 TEX. L.
REV. 1845, 1852 n.31 (1999) (quoting Bill Orr, executive director of the American
Constitutional Law Foundation).
59. Daniel Smith, ProgressivesNeed to Show Initiative on Ballot Signatures, THE
DENVER POST, Jan. 13, 2000, at B7.
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likely to congregate.6 0 Moreover, Colorado, like Washington, has
had a history of some spectacular volunteer signature drives. In
1982, fbr instance, an initiative allowing Coloradans to purchase
wine at the grocery store gathered over twice the required
61
number of signatures, with most of those coming in two days.
Also conveniently obscured by the activists' rhetoric is that in
the four elections between 1982 and 1988, 24 initiatives
qualified for the ballot in Colorado, and all of them relied
exclusively on volunteers. 62 In states like Colorado, where the
signature requirements are not onerous, paid signature
gatherers are clearly not indispensable to ballot access, at least
not for those groups with a sizeable and committed band of
activists or for those issues that capture the popular
imagination.
For many groups and issues, though, paid signature
gatherers undoubtedly are essential to reaching the ballot. The
main hurdle that most initiative proponents face is finding
enough people willing and able to dedicate a large number of
hours to gathering signatures. To collect 75,000 signatures
(which could safely be assumed to yield 50,000 valid signatures),
one expert estimates that a volunteer drive would need roughly
66 three hour volunteer shifts (two people) per week, every week
for five months. 63 People might be happy to let denturists sell
their wares directly to the public, but few if any citizens would
be willing to give up even an hour of their day to circulate
petitions on behalf of such a cause. And denturists, who have a
sizeable economic stake in the outcome, are unlikely to have
sufficient leisure time to gather the requisite signatures;
moreover, even if all the denture makers in the state or region
dropped their tools for six months and devoted themselves full
time to signature gathering their numbers would likely be too
few to qualify the measure. Gambling generally arouses more

60. Ann Schrader, Abortion Limits Proposed; Coalition Submits Petitionsfor Pair
of Ballot Initiatives,THE DENVER POST, July 8, 1998, at B1.
61. UPI wire report (July 23, 1982).
62. Because of the growth in the state's population, the number of signatures
required increased somewhat between the 1980s and 1990s. In 1984, for instance, 46,737
signatures were required, while a decade later, in 1994, 49,279 signatures were needed.
By 1998, however, the number of required signatures had reached 54,242, and heavy
turnout in the 1998 election (the signature percentage in Colorado is determined as a
percentage of the vote in the preceding secretary of state's race) meant that 62,595
signatures were required to qualify for the 2000 ballot.
63.
JIM SCHULTZ, THE INITIATIVE
CALIFORNIA'S BALLOT WARS 33 (1998).
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excitement and enthusiasm than dentures, but gaming
initiatives also have a difficult time attracting volunteers. Many
people like to gamble but it is apparently not a habit they feel so
strongly about that they are willing to devote long, arduous
hours to gathering signatures (though an anti-gambling
measure might be more likely to mobilize a cadre of volunteers
devoted to eradicating vice); and while gambling interests may
have pots of money, they have a comparative dearth of time and
numbers.
In opening up the initiative process to issues and interests
that could not otherwise play, such as denturists and gambling
proprietors, paid petitioners arguably democratize the initiative
process, making it more inclusive. Banning paid signature
gatherers penalizes those individuals or groups who possess
money but lack spare time, while advantaging those short on
money but long on time. But why should individuals with lots of
spare time be privileged over people with lots of money? Are
those groups who have difficulty raising money but no trouble
harnessing a cadre of fanatics any more deserving of a place on
the ballot than those who have an abundance of cash but lack
fervent enthusiasm? Are a small group of denture makers less
virtuous than a large band of religious zealots? From this
vantage point, the rise of paid petitioners and professional
signature gathering firms promotes democracy by increasing the
involvement of a wider diversity of groups.
Yet the complaint persists that permitting paid petitioners
64
means that "anybody can buy their way on the ballot."
Allowing rich individuals or well-financed special interests to
qualify measures for the ballot almost regardless of either the
depth or intensity of popular support seems to violate the
original vision of direct democracy.
Grassroots democracy
degenerates into "greenback democracy"; a system designed to
save us from the special interests becomes captured by those
very same interests. 65 The initiative and referendum were not
created to promote the sale of dentures and the spread of
gambling, but rather to make sure legislatures did not ignore
widespread popular sentiments for change and reform, and to

64. Scott Maier, Big Bucks Back 2 State Initiatives; Paid Professionals Circulated
Petitions, SEATrLE POST-INTELLIGENCER, Aug. 31, 1992, at Al (quoting Washington
Secretary of State, Ralph Munro).
65. For instance, Oregon's Secretary of State Phil Keisling complains: "The
promise of the initiative is grassroots democracy. It's becoming greenbacks democracy."
Henrikson, supra note 2.
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prevent self-aggrandizement or corruption on the part of
politicians and powerful interests. Initiatives such as the ones
in Washington aimed at repealing unpopular taxes, saving wild
animals, or keeping politicians honest all tap into strong popular
feelings, and the signature gathering requirement allows
proponents to demonstrate the depth of public feeling in support
of an initiative. Relying entirely on volunteers is no guarantee
that a measure has broad support in the population - after all,
many volunteer-only initiatives, like the Colorado ban on lateterm abortions, are defeated at the polls - but a successful
volunteer effort is a virtual guarantee that a significant segment
of the population feels passionately about the issue, so
passionately that they are willing to relinquish their valuable
time to ask fellow citizens for signatures. Having mobilized
their convictions and passions, having risked rejection and
courted confrontation, these advocates have earned the right to
place their issue before the voters. Those who merely purchase
their spot on the ballot have not earned that same moral right,
or so the argument goes.
V. THE COST OF BALLOT ACCESS
Has the initiative process in fact been transformed from a
grassroots to a greenbacks democracy? The answer to this
question is more complex than the activists on either side are
willing to allow. Those who bemoan the capture of the initiative
process by monied special interests ignore the reality that
organized and well-financed special interests have long been
central players in the initiative process, particularly in those
states that have made frequent use of direct democracy. Writing
in the late 1930s, political scientists V.0. Key and Winston
Crouch discovered that the battle over initiatives closely
resembled the battle over legislation - both arenas were
dominated by organized pressure groups.6 6 Proponents of the
initiative and referendum, Key and Crouch noted, "thought that
'The People' would circulate petitions and put measures on the
ballot for the promotion of the welfare of the average man. The
fight would then be over since all measures.. .fell into two welldefined categories, namely, those in the public interest and

66. KEY & CROUCH, supra note 46; see also David McCuan, Shaun Bowler, Todd
Donovan & Ken Fernandez, California'sPolitical Warriors:Campaign Professionals and
the Initiative Process, in CITIZENS AS LEGISLATORS: DIRECT DEMOCRACY IN THE UNITED

STATES 57-61 (Shaun Bowler et. al. eds., 1998).
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those for the benefit of some special interests." 67 But initiative
measures in California, Key and Crouch found, did not originate
with "The People." Instead "initiated measures, like legislative
bills, originate with some interest group which has found the
existing law unsatisfactory and seeks to secure more favorable
legal rules."68 Groups using the initiative, they reiterated, "have
not differed from the organizations lobbying before the
69
legislature. ,
Moreover, volunteer signature gatherers might be nobler
and more altruistic than paid mercenaries, but they are far from
free. Or, more precisely, while the volunteers are free, the costs
of recruiting, training and coordinating those volunteers can be
substantial. A 1998 "Initiative Cookbook," written to dispense
advice to Californians who want to "use the initiative process to
advance issues of social and economic justice," recommended
that a signature gathering drive with a large volunteer
component would need between $500,000 and $750,000 to
qualify an initiative. 70 In 1990 none of the 18 California
initiatives that reached the ballot, including the few that relied
heavily on volunteers, spent less than $500,000 in the
qualification phase; a gill net measure, for instance, which spent
only $21,000 on paid circulators, still spent $620,000 in
qualification; and a pesticides measure, which spent less than
$200,000 on paid circulators and direct mail efforts, spent an
additional million dollars to qualify the measure. 71 Even
grassroots democracy, it turns out, needs to be a rich green, at
least in California.
Still volunteer campaigns are generally less expensive than
campaigns that pay for signatures, and sometimes far less
expensive. In Washington in 1999, for instance, the volunteeronly drive that qualified the rollback of motor vehicle taxes (I695) spent only $78,000 in the qualification stage; its 400,000
valid signatures came at an average price of about twenty cents
per signature. 72 In contrast, the previous year a medical
marijuana measure in Washington (1-685) paid for all of its
signatures and needed over $400,000 to qualify the measure,
67.
68.
69.

KEY & CROUCH, supra note 46, at 444.
Id. at 572.
Id. at 487.

70.
71.

SCHULTZ, supra note 63.
CALIFORNIA COMMISSION, supra note 49, at 152.

72.
David Ammons, Tabs & Taxes Initiative Headed for Ballot, Associated Press
State & Local Wire (June 29, 1999).
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most of which went to a signature gathering firm called
Progressive Campaigns.7 3 The cost per valid signature for 1-685
was roughly two dollars a signature, ten times as high as the
cost of qualifying 1-695.
If 1-685 exemplified greenbacks
democracy - the $400,000 came entirely from three out-of-state
millionaires, including George Soros, one of the richest men in
74
the world - 1-695 was a paradigmatic grassroots campaign.
Nobody gave more than $10,000 and half of the campaign's
75
money came from individuals who contributed less than $100.
The success of 1-695 shows that the grassroots are not dead.
But even among initiatives that rely exclusively or heavily on
volunteers, 1-695 is the exception. More typical of successful
volunteer efforts are the two initiatives that qualified in
Washington in 1998: the ban on partial-birth abortions and the
minimum wage increase. Unlike Proposition 1-695, which was
fueled by a combustible mix of populist rage and the
entrepreneurial skill and energy of Tim Eyman, the 1998
measures relied heavily on existing organizations. The
minimum wage increase was drafted and sponsored by union
leaders, and the recruiting and organizing of volunteers was
done using the staff and offices of the Washington State Labor
Council, estimated by the council to be worth $57,401.76
Similarly, the anti-abortionists relied heavily on a dense
organizational network of over 2,000 churches to recruit and
train volunteers and to reach potential signatories. 77 Neither
the Christian conservatives nor the labor unions lacked for clout
in the halls of the state legislatures. That volunteer drives are
often orchestrated by organized interest groups should not be
surprising; it is after all special interest groups, not individual
citizens, who are in the best position to meet the tremendous
organizational demands of a volunteer drive. Individuals who
lack access to the organizational resources of established
interest groups are, ironically, likely to be the ones who are most
73. Robert Gavin, Backers of $30 Tabs Raked in Piles of Cash; Half Came from
Donors Giving less than $100 Each, SEATTLE POST-INTELLIGENCER, December 29, 1999,
at B1.
74. Ann Donnelly, Just Say No to Marijuana Legalization, COLUMBIAN
(Vancouver, Wash.), July 12, 1998, at B13.
75. Deidre Silva, Initiatives May Face More Rules, THE SPOKESMAN-REVIEW
(Spokane, Wash.), February 1, 1999, at Al.
76. Hal Spencer, Records Show labor as Main Force Behind Wage Initiative,
COLUMBIAN (Vancouver, Wash.), July 14, 1998, at B9.
77. Hunter P. George, Initiative Campaigns Succeed Without Paid Signature
Gatherers,THE COLUMBIAN (Vancouver, Wash.), July 2, 1998, at B2.
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reliant on greenbacks democracy.
Volunteer signature drives continue to survive for reasons
both principled and practical. By helping to reduce the cost of
the qualification phase, volunteers can help strapped initiative
campaigns save their limited resources for the electoral
contest.7 8 Volunteer signature drives also often benefit from
higher validity rates than paid signature campaigns, thus
79
effectively reducing the number of total signatures needed.
More important, involving volunteers in the signature-gathering
process can politicize citizens and mobilize groups, making it
easier to call upon their assistance later in the process or even in
subsequent initiative campaigns. Relying exclusively or heavily
on volunteers can also be a public relations coup, a signal to
relevant audiences (media, potential contributors, voters) that
the measure is a populist, grassroots movement. For some who
rely on volunteers, like the Oregon Citizen Alliance's leader Lon
Mabon, who used volunteers to qualify initiatives in four
successive elections between 1988 and 1994, and then again in
2000, it is also a matter of principle.80 "I'm a purist," Mabon
concedes. Purity has its costs, though. The OCA's attempt to
qualify anti-gay and abortion measures failed in 1996 and again,
narrowly, in 1998.81

78. Lynn Fritchman, spokesman for a group trying to qualify an Idaho measure
that would have outlawed the use of bait and dogs in hunting bears, explained that they
wanted to avoid paying for signatures because, "We know the National Rifle Association
is going to spend a whole bunch of money to defeat this, and we want to have some
money left at the last month to combat that." Marty Trillhaase, Money Helps Gather
Signatures, IDAHO STATESMAN (Boise, Id.), Nov. 12, 1995, at B1. In the end though, as
the volunteer campaign faltered, Fritchman's group was forced to pay for signatures in
order to qualify for the ballot. Kevin Richert, Bear Group Is Paying to Collect
Signatures, IDAHO FALLS POST REGISTER, April 30, 1996, at Al; Bill Loftus, Bear
Advocate Says He Has Enough Signatures, LEWISTON MORNING TRIBUNE, June 26, 1996,
at Al.
79. Kelly Kimball, head of one of the largest and most successful signature
gathering firms, Kimball Petition, Management, estimates that paid signature gatherers
have signature validity rates of between 60 and 70 percent, while well-trained volunteers
typically have rates between 75 and 80 percent. Direct-mail petitions typically do best of
all, usually ranging between 85 and 90 percent. CALIFORNIA COMMISSION, supra note
49, at 149; Daniel Lowenstein & Robert Stern, The FirstAmendment and Paid Initiative
Petition Circulators:A Dissenting View and a Proposal, 17 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 175,
199 (1989). In Oregon in 1998 and 2000, the validity rate for signatures submitted to the
Secretary of State's office for verification was about 10 percentage points higher for
volunteer-only signature drives (87 percent) than for campaigns that relied on paid
signature gatherers (76 percent).
80. SHULTZ, supra note 63, at 32.
81. Telephone Interview with Lon Mabon, Chairman, Oregon Citizen Alliance
(Jan. 12, 1999).
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For every volunteer success story there are scores of
failures. The initiative seas are strewn with the hulls of wrecked
volunteer drives. Volunteers are notoriously unpredictable, and
qualification often hangs in the balance until the closing weeks
or even days. Even Washington's 1-695 campaign, which ended
up submitting over 500,000 signatures, only had 180,000 with
less than two weeks remaining. Ten days prior to the July 2
deadline, Eyman was reported as saying that he hoped to raise
another 40,000 signatures so as "to provide a cushion"; had he
done so 1-695 would likely have failed since an invalidity rate of
20 percent (the actual invalidity rate ended up at 23%) would
have been enough to drop the initiative below the required
179,248 valid signatures. Fortunately for 1-695, Eyman's
prediction was off by more than 270,000 signatures.8 2 Volunteers
and amateurs commonly waste time reinventing the wheel or,
worse, make grievous mistakes - in Colorado, for instance, an
anti-abortion initiative campaign used volunteers to gather
57,000 valid signatures, more than enough to make the ballot,
but the measure was disqualified because circulators had
83
mistakenly used outdated forms.
The great advantage to hiring a professional signature
gathering firm is that professionals, by definition, know what
they are doing. They can tell the initiative sponsors how long it
will take to gather the required number of signatures and what
it will cost per signature. An initiative campaign that contracts
with a firm like California's Kimball Petition Management is
buying the services of a firm that has been in the business of
signature gathering for over two decades and has a remarkably
successful track record. Professional signature firms, such as
Kimball Petition Management, or the Cleveland-based National
Petition Management, drain the mystery and uncertainty from
the process. If the initiative proponents have the money,
professional signature companies can virtually guarantee almost
any measure a place on the ballot, thereby allowing initiative
backers to concentrate their energies and attention on other
stages of the process. "We handle everything," crows Dan
Kennedy, president of a Colorado signature-gathering firm. "You
just give me the petitions and we'll get them back to you, filled

82. Sally Farhat, Signatures Collected to Lower Tab Fees - Sponsors of 1-695 to
Turn in Petitions,THE SEATTLE TIMES, June 22, 1999, at B1.
83. Steve Lipsher, Ballot Drive a Job for Pros, THE DENVER POST, Sept. 19, 1994,
at Al.
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out. We've got it down to a science. 84
No political process, of course, is without uncertainty, and
even professionals can miscalculate or encounter unexpected
problems. The signature market can be volatile, particularly
toward the close of an initiative campaign. Circulators typically
carry multiple initiatives, and will make the highest paying
initiative petitions their priority. When Philip Morris pays two
dollars per signature, as they did in California in 1994 to qualify
a smoking initiative, those who circulate that petition make sure
it is the one people are asked to sign first.8 5 Getting bumped to
the rear of the initiative queue can cause an otherwise well-run
signature drive to stall; many people will sign one or two or even
three petitions but will balk at the fourth, fifth, or sixth.8 6 Short
on signatures and time, an initiative campaign will be forced (if
it can afford it) to hike its per signature price. Savvy circulators,
knowing that the cost of a signature often climbs in the closing
weeks of a campaign, have been known to withhold signatures
until the qualification deadline nears in hopes of fetching a
better price for their wares.
Courts, too, can inject uncertainty into the signature
gathering process. In 1988, for instance, the California Supreme
Court struck down a no-fault insurance initiative that had
already paid for hundreds of thousands of signatures. The
insurance companies were forced to redraft the measure and
begin gathering signatures all over again.87 For most
organizations this eleventh hour judicial setback would have
been fatal, but deep pockets enabled the insurance companies to
hire a direct mail firm, which gathered the required 400,000
plus signatures in just 48 days. To achieve this feat cost the
insurance industry 2.3 million dollars, a mere drop in the bucket
though compared to the 14.5 million dollars that the industry
84.

Id.

85.

SCHULTZ, supra note 63, at 34.

86. One professional signature gatherer, who had worked in at least six different
states, testified in court that "it's mostly the placement of the petition, and how much
the petitioner pushes it [that determines what gets signed]. You're only going to get
them to sign 3 out of 10 petitions so you figure your 3 most profitable petitions [are the
ones you push]." Tr. of July 10, 1999, hearing at 98, Affinity Communication v. Crosley,
(testimony of Michael Rhodes before the Oregon State Employment Office), rev'd sub
nom. Canvasser Serv. Inc. v. Employment Dep't, 987 P.2d 562 (Or. App. 1999); see also
David Broder, Taking the Initiative on Petitions: Signatures for a Price, WASHINGTON
POST NATIONAL WEEKLY EDITION, April 20, 1998, at 11; CALIFORNIA COMMISSION, supra
note 49, at 147.
87. Craig B. Holman & Robert Stern, Judicial Review of Ballot Initiatives: The
ChangingRole of State and Federal Courts, 31 Loy. L.A. L. REV. 1239, 1243 n.29 (1998).
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reportedly spent on behalf of the no-fault measure in the
qualification phase. 88 The ballot titling process can also disrupt
well-laid plans. If opponents challenge a ballot title, as often
happens with controversial measures, the title is appealed to the
courts. The appeal process can be time-consuming, and since
signature gathering generally cannot commence until a ballot
title has been fixed, initiative campaigns are sometimes left with
considerably less time to gather signatures than state law
permits.
Despite these uncertainties, however, professional signature
gathering firms rarely fail to reach their signature targets. On
those occasions when they fail to qualify a measure it is usually
because the percentage of invalid signatures is unexpectedly
high, the sponsors' money dries up, or the professional firm has
been hired too late in the signature-gathering season to rescue a
faltering volunteer campaign.8 9 One study reported that of the
53 initiative campaigns that had retained the services of
Kimball Petition Management through 1988, all but one reached
the ballot. In that one case the firm met the signature target it
had set but had an unusually high percentage of signatures
declared invalid. 90
The impressive success rates of paid
signature firms make the job security of congressional
incumbents seem downright hazardous by comparison.
Not that all initiatives are equally easy to qualify.
Individuals do not generally scrutinize the petition they sign indeed many do not bother to read it at all - but a popular ballot
measure is still easier to qualify than an unpopular or confusing
one. A less popular measure may require the signature
gathering firm to charge a higher per signature price. But if
popular appeal affects the cost of the initiative it generally has
little impact on whether an initiative qualifies, assuming the
backers have the requisite money. 91 The key variable is not the
88. Charles M. Price, Afloat on a Sea of Cash, CALIFORNIA JOURNAL, Nov. 1988, at
484; CALIFORNIA COMMISSION, supra note 49, at 132.
89. An example of the latter is Ohio Governor George Voinovich's failed attempt to
qualify a campaign finance measure. With less than a month left and still far short of the
required 104,000 signatures, the campaign turned in desperation to American Petition
Corporation, but even a $200,000 campaign war chest and a price of better than $1 per
signature was not enough to rescue the effort by the December 23 deadline. Benjamin
Marrison, CampaignReform Drive Faces Hurdle, THE PLAIN DEALER (Cleveland, Ohio),
Dec. 14, 1994, at 5B.
90. Lowenstein & Stern, supra note 79.
91. Those who doubt this might find the following experiment of interest: earlier
this year Patty Wentz of Oregon's Voter Education Project wrote a petition that said
only: "We, the undersigned voters, request that a measure for an idea be submitted to
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attitude of those who sign the petition. People sign for lots of
reasons that have nothing to do with the substance of the
petition. Instead, the key variable is the number of people who
can be solicited. Initiative proponents who possess the resources
to approach enough people can qualify any, or almost any
measure. The emergence of professional signature gathering
firms have not made huge sums of money a necessary condition
of ballot access for all groups or issues, but it has meant money
92
is now a sufficient condition of ballot access.
Those who mourn the passing of the grassroots initiative
may justly be accused of romanticizing the initiative's past, but
stalwart defenders of the initiative as the authentic voice of the
people are guilty of whitewashing its present condition. In
California in 1976, the median expenditure during the
qualification phase was only $44,861 and the mean was $69,398.
In 1978, the backers of Proposition 13 spent even less than that,
and still managed to gather a million and a quarter signatures,
which remains a record for any initiative campaign. During the
1980s, the median qualification expenditure in California
exceeded $700,000, and by 1990, both the median and mean
climbed over one million dollars. 93 Throughout the 1990s,
qualification expenses in California routinely ranged between
one and two million dollars. Unlike in the 1970s, when the bulk
of the money spent by an initiative campaign to qualify a
measure generally went to support a staff and organization as
well as printing and distributing literature, in the last two

the people of Oregon for their approval or rejection at the election to be held on
November 8, 2002." The project then sent petitioners out on the street to gather
signatures for the fictitious initiative; the rules were that all they could say was, "This is
a petition for an idea. Can you help us get this idea on the ballot?" They gathered 25
signatures in 10 minutes. Occasionally a citizen would question them and then the
phony petitioners would congratulate the person for being an informed voter. But
precious few people questioned them. Most just signed, without ever asking what the
idea was.
92. See generally, CALIFORNIA COMMISSION, supra note 49, at 132, 147 n.60;
Lowenstein & Stem, supra note 79, at 203, 204 n.128; Garrett, supra note 58, at 1849.
That any, or virtually any, issue can make it to the ballot if the backers have the money
is attested to by multiple sources: see, e.g., Larry Berg & C.B. Holman, The Initiative
Process and its Declining Agenda-setting Value, 11 LAw AND POLICY 458 (Oct. 1989);
Lowenstein & Stern, supra note 79, at 175, 199; David B. Magleby & Kelly D. Patterson,
Consultants and DirectDemocracy, P.S. 31, June 1998, at 161; CALIFORNIA COMMISSION,
supra note 49, at 35; Garrett, supra note 58, at 1852; THE CITY CLUB OF PORTLAND,
REPORT ON THE INITIATIVE AND REFERENDUM IN OREGON 27 (1996); P. K. Jameson &

Marsha Hosack, Citizen Initiatives in Florida:An Analysis of Florida's Constitutional
InitiativeProcess,Issues andAlternatives, 23 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 417, 446 n.269 (1995).
93. CALIFORNIA COMMISSION, supra note 49, at 157-59.
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decades of the twentieth century the cash flowed almost entirely
to professional campaign consultants, pollsters, lawyers, and
94
most especially professional signature gathering firms.
Outside of California, of course, the amount of money
required to qualify an initiative is usually dramatically less.
Expert witnesses testifying before a committee of the Portland
City Club in 1996 reported that $100,000 to $150,000 was
95
sufficient to get a measure on the ballot in Oregon.
Interviewed in 1999, Rick Arnold, who runs National Voter
Outreach, a Nevada-based signature gathering firm that has
been in operation since 1979, estimated that $80,000 to
$100,000 was enough to be assured of the necessary signatures
in Colorado. 96 In Idaho $60,000 to $70,000 is generally sufficient
to secure a spot on the ballot. These are not trivial amounts of
money, particularly if one were required to raise the money in
relatively small contributions, as federal and many state laws
require candidates to do.9 7 But since there are no limits on what
an individual or group can contribute to an initiative campaign
these amounts are not difficult to reach even for a single
(wealthy) individual. In Oregon in 1996, for instance, three
initiatives were qualified by a rich eye doctor, who wrote and
bankrolled each of the measures himself. To qualify all three
initiatives, none of which received more than 35% of the vote,
cost the doctor under $200,000.98 In 2002, to take a more recent
example, Loren Parks, an eccentric and reclusive millionaire,
single-handedly secured a place on the ballot for two initiatives
(Measures 21 and 22) that would have transformed the way
judges were elected. Qualifying the two constitutional
amendments cost Parks $256,453, which was 99.7% of the total
amount raised by the two qualifying campaigns. 99 Ironically, the
mammoth sums of money required in California may increase
the chances that qualification of a measure reflects broader
public or group support.
Mountains of cash are not necessarily evidence of a

94.

See Berg & Holman, supra note 92, at 455-57.

95.

CITY CLUB OF PORTLAND, supra note 92.

96. Michael Roman, Ruling Not Expected to Boost Initiatives, THE ROCKY
MOUNTAIN NEWS (Denver, Colo.), Jan. 13, 1999, at 18A.
97. Betsy Z. Russell, Grass-Roots Ballot Initiatives Withering, THE SPOKESMANREVIEW (Spokane, Wash.), July 8, 1998, at Al.
98. The Priceof Petitioning,THE OREGONIAN, July 25, 1996, at A15.
99. Press Release, One Donor is Big Bucks Behind 3 of 11 Initiatives (July 24,
2002), available at http://oregonfollowthemoney.org/July2402.html.
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withering of the grassroots. If many, many people are
contributing money to an initiative campaign, then money can
be one measure (albeit a highly imperfect one) of breadth of
support and intensity of preference. Although grassroots purists
might prefer to see different, "higher" forms of involvement, like
attending meetings or gathering signatures, giving money to
political campaigns is one important form of political
involvement in our society. The trouble is that the U.S. Supreme
Court, by prohibiting any limits on what individuals or groups
can contribute to initiative campaigns, has created an
environment in which initiative campaigns have little or no
incentive to seek out smaller contributions. Instead the legal
regime established by the Court encourages initiative campaigns
to seek out a few fat cats and sugar daddies who will bankroll
the effort and save initiative sponsors the more time-consuming
effort of raising money from the little guy (and gal). 100 In
California in 1990, for instance, contributions of under $1,000
made up only six percent of the total contributions in support of
or in opposition to initiative campaigns. Thirty-seven percent (or
roughly forty million dollars) of the total initiative dollars came
from 19 donors, and 67 percent (74 million) came from 141
individuals and organizations, each of which gave at least
$100,000. Almost as much money came from Anheuser Busch
(8.3 million dollars in opposition to a proposed liquor tax) as was
given by the 18,000 contributors who gave less than $1,000. A
glance at the 1998 general election in California shows that
little has changed. More than half of the almost 10 million
dollars raised to support a tobacco tax came from four
individuals, two of whom were married to each other. Five of the
seven ballot initiatives received an average of 3 or 4 percent of
their contributions from donors giving under $10,000; the only
two measures to receive a respectable percentage of their
support in smaller amounts were a measure forbidding the
slaughter of horses for horsemeat (23% of its contributions came
from people who gave under $10,000) and another banning the
use of some kinds of animal traps and poisons (39% came from
contributions of less than $10,000). Both of these measures, not
coincidentally, were passed overwhelmingly by the voters - the
average support was 58 percent. In contrast, the mean support
for the other five measures was only 44 percent.10 1

100.
101.

See discussion infra Part VI.
CALIFORNIA COMMISSION, supra note 49, at 274, 279-80. The 1998 figures are
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These statistics refer to overall spending, not just the costs
of qualification, and so tend to overestimate the popular basis of
financial support at the qualification phase. For instance, in
1990, Harold Arbit, a wealthy investor, contributed 5 million
dollars in support of "Forests Forever" (Proposition 130), which
equaled roughly two-thirds of the total contributions to the
initiative campaign. But he bankrolled essentially the entire one
million dollars it took to qualify the initiative. 10 2 Arbit's largesse
is unusual - indeed the 5 million dollar contribution was at the
time a record for an individual contribution to a ballot initiative
and was itself a major issue in the campaign - but the pattern of
initiative contributions being more concentrated among fewer
people in the qualification stage than the post-qualification
phase is commonplace. Media attention, in California and
elsewhere, tends to focus on the huge sums of money raised and
spent in the post-qualification stage, particularly as television
ads begin to hammer the airwaves, but it is the contributions at
the qualification phase that should concern us most.
To begin with, money can essentially guarantee a spot on
the ballot, whereas no amount of money can guarantee an
electoral victory. Huge amounts of money have been spent on
spectacular defeats, and vast sums have been spent opposing
successful efforts. In Florida in 1994, for instance, over 16
million dollars was spent to promote a casino initiative that
10 3
failed miserably, receiving less than 40 percent of the vote.
The $35 million spent by the insurance industry in 1988 in
California on behalf of no-fault auto insurance also was for
naught, and even failed to prevent passage of a rival auto
insurance measure that the insurance companies had hoped to
defeat. 10 4 Tobacco companies have frequently spent mammoth
amounts of money in efforts to defeat tobacco tax initiatives, and
have usually been unsuccessful. In Oregon in 1996, for instance,
the tobacco industry outspent the proponents of a cigarette tax
increase by almost ten-to-one, yet the industry lost by a sizeable
margin. 0 5 In 2000, 31 million dollars (about three-quarters of

calculated from the campaign finance data available on-line from the California
Secretary of State's office, at http://www.ss.ca.gov./;. see also Big Givers Dominate

Initiatives, STATE

GOVERNMENT NEWS,

Sept. 1992, at 25.

102.
CALIFORNIA COMMISSION, supra note 49, at 158, 265, 274.
103. Jameson & Hosack, supra note 92, at 447.
104. Id. at 447 n.279.
105. Steve Woodward, It's Not Always the Money That Matters, OREGONIAN, Nov. 9,
1996, at Al.
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which came from Tim Draper, a Silicon Valley entrepreneur)
was spent in support of a school voucher initiative in California
that failed to get above thirty percent of the vote. The same fate
befell a vouchers initiative in Michigan despite a pro-vouchers
campaign that spent about 13 million dollars, two-and-a-half
times what the opposition spent. Of course, having money is
better than not having money, and the evidence shows that
heavy and lopsided spending against a measure is frequently
effective in defeating the measure. 10 6 But in electoral contests,
unlike in qualification campaigns, money is not a sufficient
10 7
condition for success.
Moreover, although the large sums spent on 30 second
television ads in the closing months and weeks of an electoral
campaign may not be pretty, they are essential if voters are to
have any chance of arriving at an informed opinion about an
initiative. In candidate races many voters can rely on the party
as a cue to make reasonably informed decisions even with
relatively little information. Partisan cues (in the forms of
endorsements) are available in many initiative campaigns, but
they do not come conveniently stamped on the ballot, and take
more work on the voter's part to ferret out. Television ads,
though often obnoxious to the more educated voter, can be
essential in giving the less-informed voter a rudimentary
understanding of a measure's meaning as well as a rough sense
of who is for it and who is against it. Those most concerned
about the potential dangers of lawmaking by initiative are those
who should be most vigilant not to restrict the flow of money to
initiative campaigns, for it is only through spending large sums
of money that opponents of a measure can educate voters about
the unintended consequences and pitfalls of a bill.
But concentrated spending by one or a few individuals at
the qualification stage is conceptually quite another matter. For
here money sabotages the purpose of a signature requirement,
which is to demonstrate intensity and breadth of popular
support. If paid circulators are used to gather all or virtually all
of the signatures then a campaign's capacity to gather those
signatures is no longer a reliable indicator of public interest.
Only the task of raising money is left as a meaningful way in
which initiative sponsors can show the existence of public
interest in their measure. But if a single individual, or a small

106.
107.

Dubois & Feeney, supra note 4, at 181-88.
Garrett, supra note 58, at 1847.

https://scholarworks.umt.edu/mlr/vol64/iss1/4

36

2003 Ellis:
SIGNATURE GATHERING IN THE INITIATIVE PROCESS
Signature Gathering in the Initiative Process: How Democratic Is It?71
handful of people, can finance the qualification of an initiative,
then this hurdle too is knocked over and rendered useless. If, on
the other hand, individuals were limited to contributing no more
than $100 or even $1,000 (or perhaps more in a state the size of
California) to the qualification of an initiative, then the
qualification of a ballot measure, even with paid signature
gatherers, could again serve as a useful test of popular interest
or support. Unfortunately, states wanting to make qualification
a meaningful hurdle have been prevented from doing so by the
courts.
VI. THE JUDICIAL PREEMPTION OF POLITICS
The first barriers to a state's ability to make qualification a
meaningfully democratic exercise were erected by the United
States Supreme Court in the landmark 1976 case, Buckley v.
Valeo, in which the Court considered the constitutionality of a
host of limitations on campaign finance practices that had been
passed by Congress in 1974.108 In its ruling the Court
distinguished between contributions and expenditures, arguing
that limitations on expenditures (what a candidate can spend)
impermissibly reduce "the quantity of expression by reducing
the number of issues discussed, the depth of their exploration,
and the size of the audience reached," while contribution limits
entail "only a marginal restriction upon the contributor's ability
to engage in free communication." 10 9 A contributor who would
like to give $5,000 but is limited by law to $1,000 has still been
able clearly to communicate his message of support for a
candidate; in contrast, restricting a candidate's spending to
$100,000 when she could have spent $500,000 would drastically
limit her ability to communicate her message to potential voters.
Given the more indirect impact on freedom of expression
imposed by contribution limits, the Court accepted that the
limits were justified by the government's "weighty interest" in
preventing "corruption and the appearance of corruption
spawned by the real or imagined coercive influence of large
financial contributions on candidates' positions and on their
actions if elected to office." 1 0 No such compelling interest exists
in the case of expenditure limits, the Court ruled. Neither the
government's interest in controlling campaign costs nor in
108.

424 U.S. 1 (1976).

109.
110.

Id. at 20-21.
Id. at 25.
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equalizing spending between campaigns could justify the
substantial restraints on "the quantity and diversity of political
speech" that expenditure ceilings would entail.1 1 1
Buckley v. Valeo had nothing specifically to say about the
initiative and referendum; its subject was candidate elections.
The uncertainty as to where Buckley v. Valeo left direct
democracy was quickly answered, however, by the Court's
decision in First Nat'l Bank of Boston v. Bellotti. 112 This case
challenged a Massachusetts law that forbid business
corporations from contributing or spending any money "for the
purpose of.. .influencing or affecting the vote on any question
submitted to the voters, other than one materially affecting any
of the property, business or assets of the corporation.' 1 13 The
statute explicitly excluded corporations
from financial
involvement with any measure "concerning the taxation of the
income, property or transactions of individuals.' 1 14 Such a
statute, a bare majority of the Court held, was impermissible
because "the risk of corruption perceived in cases involving
candidate elections simply is not present in a popular vote on a
public issue.' 1 15 Such sweeping language suggested that even
less draconian regulations would have a hard time passing
constitutional muster, a suspicion confirmed a few years later in
Citizens Against Rent Control v. City of Berkeley, in which the
Court struck down a city ordinance that limited contributions to
ballot measure committees to $250 on the grounds that the
threat of corruption was absent in ballot elections." 6 In the
Court's view, public disclosure of contributions was sufficient to
1 7
safeguard the integrity of the political system.
The U.S. Supreme Court's pronouncements in Bellotti and
Berkeley meant that once a measure qualified for the ballot the
states could do virtually nothing to restrict the flow of money to
initiative campaigns. So long as states were free to ban paid
petitioners, however, the states still had the power to restrict
the influence of money at the qualification stage. Wealthy
individuals could not be prevented from supporting their
favorite causes, but by banning paid petitioners a state could
111. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. at 19.
112. 435 U.S. 765 (1978).
113. Id.at 768.
114. Id.
115. Id. at 790.
116. 454 U.S. 290, 297-300 (1981).
117. Id.
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stop a wealthy individual from simply buying a place on the
ballot. That option was unceremoniously closed by the Supreme
Court in Meyer v. Grant, which declared that circulating an
initiative petition was "core political speech" for which "First
Amendment protection is at its zenith."118 Prohibiting paid
signature gatherers restricts speech in two ways. First, it
directly restricts the amount of speech that occurs during the
petition circulation phase; second, it indirectly burdens speech
by making it less likely that an initiative will qualify for the
ballot, thus reducing the proponents' chances of making their
issue "the focus of statewide discussion."1 19 In the Court's view,
the state of Colorado failed to offer a justification that was
sufficiently compelling to warrant the burden on political
120
expression that the ban imposed.
Writing for a unanimous Court, Justice John Paul Stevens
dismissed Colorado's claim that the prohibition was justified by
the state's "interest in assuring that an initiative has sufficient
grassroots support to be placed on the ballot." According to
Stevens, that interest was "adequately protected by the
requirement that the specified number of signatures be
obtained.' 21 This sweeping judicial pronouncement comes
without a scrap of supporting evidence. But if, as we have seen,
a single individual can pay a professional signature gathering
firm to qualify virtually any issue, then Stevens is clearly
wrong. When there are no restrictions on what an individual can
contribute to an initiative campaign and when paid signature
gatherers are permitted, then a signature requirement is no
guarantee that an initiative has grassroots support. One could
perhaps sympathize with the Court had it said that the First
Amendment right of free expression outweighs the state's
interest in ensuring grassroots involvement, but instead it only
betrayed its ignorance of the initiative process.1 22
When the United States District Court upheld the Colorado
ban in 1984 it had emphasized that Colorado ranked fourth in
the number of initiatives placed on the ballot, ahead of at least
20 states that allowed paid petitioners. This evidence suggested
to the court that "the prohibition against payment of circulators

118.
119.
120.
121.
122.

486 U.S. 414, 425 (1988).
Id. at 422-23.
Id. at 428.
Id. at 425.
See Lowenstein & Stern, supra note 79, at 200-205.
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is in reality no inhibition."123 The court might also have pointed
out that paid petitioners were banned in two other states in the
top six, Washington (#6) and Oregon (#1). The Supreme Court
quite rightly countered that these numbers did not preclude the
possibility that even more petitions would have made it to the
ballot had Colorado not banned paid petitioners. Had the Court
known more about the history of the initiative in Colorado, they
might also have pointed out that Colorado did not enact its ban
until 1941 and that Colorado had as many initiatives on the
ballot in its first 30 years with paid petitioners as they had in
the next nearly 50 years without paid petitioners. Had the Court
really wanted to impress, it might also have noted that in
Oregon initiatives appeared on the ballot three times as often in
the decades before paid petitioners were banned. But though the
Supreme Court was right to reject the District Court's empirical
argument, Stevens and company then made a far more
egregious error by assuming that if banning paid petitioners
makes ballot access more difficult, as it undoubtedly does, then
124
to restrict paid petitioners is to suppress political speech.
However, as Daniel Lowenstein and his colleagues have pointed
out, Stevens' argument "can hardly be taken seriously. The First
Amendment prevents suppression of speech but does not require
states to place measures on the ballot in order to encourage
speech." 125 If Stevens' logic were to be followed, then all effective
restrictions on ballot access - including geographical
distribution requirements, short circulation windows, or high
signature requirements - would be unconstitutional. A state
that imposes a 15 percent signature requirement, for instance,
does at least as much or more to restrict ballot access than a
state that bans paid signature gatherers. Stevens cannot
seriously believe that states are under a constitutional
obligation to maximize the number of initiatives on a ballot, but
unless he is willing to accept this position his argument
collapses. The number of initiatives on the ballot is irrelevant to
126
the First Amendment.
The Court's naivete about the initiative process was evident,
too, in its idealized discussion of petition circulation. According
123.
124.
125.

Grant v. Meyer, 741 F.2d 1210, 1213 (10th Cir. 1984).
Meyer, 486 U.S. at 424.
Caroline Tolbert, Daniel H. Lowenstein & Todd Donovan, Election Law and

Rules for Using Initiatives, in CITIZENS AS LEGISLATORS: DIRECT DEMOCRACY IN THE U.S.

36 (Todd Donovan et al. eds., 1998).
126. See Lowenstein & Stern, supra note 79, at 215.
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to Stevens, a petition circulator will "at least have to persuade
[the potential signer] that the matter is one deserving of the
public
scrutiny
and debate
that would
attend its
consideration.. .This will in almost every case involve an
explanation of the nature of the proposal and why its advocates
support it."127 Thus the activity of signature solicitation is
clearly "core political speech." The only evidence the Court
provided as to what occurs "in almost every case," however, was
the testimony of one person, an appellee in the case, Paul Grant,
who claimed:
you tell the person your purpose, that you are circulating a
petition to qualify the issue on the ballot in November, and tell
them what about, and they say, 'Please let me know a little bit
more.' Typically, that takes maybe a minute or two, the process of
explaining to the persons that you are trying to put the initiative
on the ballot to exempt Colorado transportation from [State Public
Utilities Commission] regulations. Then you ask the person if they
will sign your petition. If they hesitate, you try to come up with
additional arguments to get them to sign .... [We try] to
explain.. .not just deregulation in this industry, that it would free
up.. .industry from being cartelized, allowing freedom from moral
choices, price competition for the first time, lowering price costs,
which we estimate prices in Colorado to be $150 million a year in
monopoly benefits. We have tried to convey the unfairness and
injustice of the existing system, where some businesses are denied
to go into business simply to protect the profits of existing
128
companies.

The

Court uncritically

accepted

Grant's

account while

ignoring a vast body of evidence suggesting that most
encounters bear little resemblance to the one described by
Grant, particularly when (as is usually true with paid signature
gatherers) the circulator is pushing multiple, unrelated petitions
at once. One initiative "campaign manual" explicitly instructs
signature gatherers not to "converse at length with signers or
attempt to answer lengthy questions. While such a conversation
is in progress, a hundred people may walk by unsolicited. The
goal of the table operation is to get petition signatures, not
educate voters."1 29 Ed Koupal, one of the most successful
signature gatherers in California in the 1970s, worked on the
maxim that "a signature table is not a library." In an interview
published in 1975, he described "the hoopla process" that his
127.
128.

Meyer, 486 U.S. at 421.
Id. at 422 n.4.

129.

David D. Schmidt, CITIZEN LAW MAKERS: THE BALLOT INITIATIVE REVOLUTION

199 (1989).
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While one person sits at the table, the other walks up to people
and asks two questions. (We operate on the old selling maxim that
two yesses make a sale.) First, we ask if they are a registered
voter. If they say yes, we ask them if they are registered in that
county. If they say yes to that, we immediately push them up to
the table where the person sitting points to a petition and says,
'Sign this.' By
this time the person feels, 'Oh, goodie, I get to play,'
130
and signs it.

Similar is the description that Kelly Kimball offers of the
training Kimball Petition Management gives its circulators:
Our training is, the first thing you do is ask [potential signers]
which county are you registered to vote in. [Then we ask] will you
sign a petition for a California state lottery. For the most part
that's all you have to say. If they want more information, you have
a second line. California lottery is good for schools. Well, they
want more information. At that point you hand them a petition
and text sheet. You say come back to me if you want to sign it.
After two or three
lines it doesn't become cost effective to argue
131
with a person.

People sign, Kimball explains, "because you ask them to
sign.' 1 32 Even Paul Grant himself admitted that people were
more likely to sign when he told them it was his birthday, a fact
1 33
that Justice Stevens conveniently left out.
Stevens' rose-colored portrait of signature gathering is
offered to bolster his argument that "core political speech" is
implicated; but in fact the characterization is largely irrelevant.
Even if signature gathering is typically closer to the description
offered by Koupal and Kimball than the one pedaled by Grant,
the act of gathering signatures in public places would still be a
constitutionally protected activity. But Colorado did not restrict
a person's right to engage in signature gathering; rather the
state said only that one could not be paid for doing so. The
Court's fallback position, relying on Buckley, is that paying
people to circulate initiative petitions is itself a form of speech
and thus warrants heightened First Amendment protection that
creates a burden on
the state that is "well-nigh
insurmountable."1 34 Such is the shadow Buckley casts that the
District Court judge who upheld the ban also tried to invoke
Buckley to argue that paying a signature gatherer was more like
130.
131.
132.
133.

Lowenstein & Stern, supra note 79, at 197.
Id. at 198.
Id.
Id. at 182; see also, Grant v. Meyer, 741 F.2d at 1214.

134.

Meyer, 486 U.S. at 425.
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a contribution than a campaign expenditure and thus did not
warrant the same level of constitutional scrutiny. 135 There is
little to choose between these two metaphysical positions. Both
judicial pronouncements divert us from the important empirical
and normative questions, questions that courts are ill-equipped
to handle: Does a ban on paid signature gatherers promote
grassroots democracy and civic involvement? Does it help ensure
that measures reaching the ballot have a sufficiently broad base
of support to warrant public consideration? Does it help to
promote public trust in the initiative process? Does it help to
keep the number of measures on the ballot to a manageable
level or does it mean that the hurdles to ballot qualification are
impossibly high? Answers to these questions will surely vary by
state; what works in South Dakota will not necessarily be
effective or desirable in California. One-size-fits-all court edicts
preempt a healthy political debate about the appropriate role of
the initiative process in a democracy. And by closing down the
states as "laboratories of reform," in the famous phrase of Louis
Brandeis, the courts limit our ability to discover the relative
merits of different ways of regulating the initiative process.
The U.S. Supreme Court, however, shows little sign of
extricating itself from the political thicket it has entered. Indeed
judging by its 1999 ruling in Buckley v. American Constitutional
Law Foundation,Inc., a majority seems intent on plunging ever
deeper into the judicial jungle. 136 In Buckley v. American, the
Court considered the constitutionality of a number of
regulations that Colorado had placed on signature gatherers in
the aftermath of Meyer. Forced by the Court in 1988 to allow
paid signature gatherers, Colorado took steps to regulate paid
signature gatherers, focusing in particular on making it possible
for the public to ascertain which initiatives were using paid
signature gatherers. 37 If the state could not stop them from
circulating petitions at least it could make citizens aware of
their presence. To this end, Colorado enacted a requirement that
petition circulators must wear an identification badge indicating
whether they are being paid for their services and by whom.
The requirement also specified that initiative sponsors file
monthly and final reports identifying the name, address and
compensation of each paid circulator, and the amount of money
135. Id. at 1212; see also Tolbert, Lowenstein & Donovan, supra note 125, at 36;
Lowenstein & Stern, supra note 79, at 183.
136. 525 U.S. 182 (1999).
137. Buckley v. American, 525 U.S. at 187-89.'
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paid per signature. The Court struck down the identification
badge and disclosure requirement as unconstitutional
infringements on political expression. In addition, the Court
invalidated Colorado's requirement that petition circulators be
registered voters, a regulation that is commonplace in initiative
states and exists in many states for candidate petitions as well.
Colorado's law, which applies to candidate petitions no less than
initiative petitions, had been on the books in Colorado since
1980 when it was approved by the voters in a legislative
138
referendum.
Although the opinion has been hailed by initiative
enthusiasts and bewailed by initiative skeptics, the decision was
in some ways more limited in its scope than was generally
recognized in press accounts. In particular, the Court explicitly
refused to judge the constitutionality of the requirement that
the badge disclose whether the circulator is paid and by whom.
Following the Court of Appeals, the Supreme Court limited its
opinion to the requirement that the badge identify the name of
the circulator. All nine justices agreed that requiring an
individual to wear an identity badge was unacceptable, and
indeed it is hard to see any strong state interest in compelling
circulators to display their names on a badge. The purpose of the
badge should not be to reveal the personal identity of the
circulator but to inform the signer whether the circulator is
being paid and by whom. For now at least, Colorado and other
states are still free to require circulators to wear badges that
indicate whether they are paid and by whom, so long as that
139
badge does not also include the individual's name.
Although the Court agreed that forcing the circulator to
divulge his identity at the point of solicitation was
unconstitutional, they were sharply divided as to whether the
state could compel the circulator to relinquish his anonymity in
monthly or final reports. In the majority's view, the substantial
state interest in maintaining the integrity of the initiative
process was served by requiring a measure's proponents to
divulge their names and the total amount they spent to collect

138. Id. at 190 nn.5-8.
139. Id. at 200. In truth, such badges, with or without names, are unlikely to be
effective. As DuBois and Feeney point out, circulators might very well "seek and obtain
signatures by using the disclosure as the basis for an appeal for voter support to help
them achieve some worthy personal goal (e.g., pay the rent, go to college, travel abroad)
wholly unrelated to the content of the petition." DUBOIS & FEENEY, supra note 4, at 102;
see also Lowenstein & Stem, supra note 79, at 220.
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signatures. The added value of revealing the names of the paid
circulators and the amounts paid to each of them "is hardly
apparent, and has not been demonstrated." "What is of interest
is the payor, not the payees," the Court concluded. 140 Three
justices (O'Connor, Breyer, and Rehnquist) disagreed. "As a
regulation of the electoral process with an indirect and
insignificant effect on speech," O'Connor argued, "the disclosure
provision should be upheld so long as it advances a legitimate
government interest."' 4 ' And for O'Connor it was self-evident
that Colorado's "stated interests in combating fraud and
providing the public with information about petition circulation"
were sufficient to meet this level of review. 142 Indeed so
substantial were these interests that O'Connor affirmed that she
would have upheld the regulations even had she believed more
exacting scrutiny were required. In the view of the three
dissenting justices, whether voters should be interested in the
payee as well as the payor was a judgment properly left to the
143
states.
Perhaps the most important and disturbing aspect of the
Court's ruling was its decision to invalidate the state's
requirement that circulators must be registered voters. It is this
aspect of the decision that most clearly reveals the poverty of the
reasoning in Meyer. For the majority, it was "beyond question"
that "Colorado's registration requirement drastically reduces the
number of persons, both volunteer and paid, available to
circulate petitions. That requirement produces a speech
diminution of the very kind produced by the ban on paid
circulators at issue in Meyer."1' Banning paid circulators, like
restricting circulators to registered voters, "'limit[s] the number
of voices who will convey [the initiative proponents'] message'
and, consequently, cut[s] down 'the size of the audience
[proponents] can reach. 1 4 5 The Court thus rejected a regulation
that had existed for years in all but a handful of initiative
states, including every state that used the initiative with great
frequency. The Court's decision also would appear to call into
question a whole host of state laws that use registration as a
140.
141.
142.
143.
2000).
144.
145.

Buckley v.American,, 525 U.S. at 203.
Id. at 222.
Id.
Id. at 231; see also Wash. Initiatives Now v. Ripple, 213 F.3d 1132 (9th Cir.
Buckley v. American, 525 U.S. at 182.
Id.
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means of regulating the political process. Most directly, the
decision threatens the requirement that candidate petition
circulators be registered voters, a requirement that exists in
many states, including a large number that do not possess the
initiative process. 146 Also in jeopardy are laws like the one in
Oregon which mandates that only registered voters may file a
petition with the Oregon Supreme Court challenging a ballot
title.
Given the ubiquity of state regulations that limit political
activities (including voting and signing a petition) to registered
voters, it is understandable that the majority's decision
provoked something approaching disbelief from the three
dissenting justices, each of whom viewed registration
requirements as well within the states' power to regulate their
own electoral processes. "State ballot initiatives are a matter of
state concern," Rehnquist tried to remind the Court, "and a state
should be able to limit the ability to circulate initiative petitions
to those people who can ultimately vote on those initiatives at
the polls."1 47 What concerned Rehnquist most was the Court's
insistence that a state regulation was constitutionally suspect if
it either decreased "the pool of potential circulators" or reduced
"the chances that a measure would gather signatures sufficient
to qualify for the ballot." Under this "highly abstract and
mechanical test," Rehnquist pointed out, the validity of almost
148
any regulation of petition circulation is called into question.
The majority tried to blunt Rehnquist's objection by quoting
Robert Bork to the effect that "Judges and lawyers live on the
slippery slope of analogies; they are not supposed to ski to the
bottom." 149 But the trouble is that the majority opinion leaves
state legislatures and lower courts little guidance as to how far
down the slope the Court desires to ski. Observers can only
wonder why a state can require candidates for office to be
registered voters (as the Court has held in a previous case) but

146. At the time of Buckley v. American, some twenty states required that party or
candidate petitioners be registered voters: Arizona, California, Colorado, Connecticut,
Idaho, Illinois, Kansas, Michigan, Missouri, Nebraska, New Jersey, New York, Ohio,
Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, South Dakota, Virginia, West Virginia, Wisconsin, and
Wyoming. Since Buckley v. American, Arizona and Idaho have repealed the requirement,
and federal district courts in Illinois have struck it down twice. Both district courts
based their decision on Buckley v. American. BALLOT NEWS, Aug. 3, 1999, and Sept. 1,
2000.
147. Buckley v. American, 525 U.S. at 155.
148. Id. at 228.
149. Id. at 195 n.16.
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cannot require the same of petition circulators. And if states
cannot mandate that petition circulators be registered voters,
then why can they insist that petition signers be registered
voters? Would the Court also strike down a residency
requirement for signers? If one rigorously follows the logic of the
Court's "abstract and mechanical test" articulated in Meyer and
repeated in Buckley v. American, then residence requirements
would seem to be doomed, as would many other initiative
regulations. The Court's "sphinx-like silence" on the residence
requirement, together with the circumscribed character of its
decision regarding the badge and disclosure requirements,
suggests, however, that the Court is hesitant to follow the
0
demanding logic of Meyer.15
Meyer's potential to transform the entire regulatory
environment of the signature gathering process had been
immediately grasped by initiative activists. After Meyer,
initiative proponents began to challenge all sorts of initiative
regulations, some of which (like the identification badge and the
payee disclosure requirements) were themselves enacted in
response to Meyer's ban on paid circulators, but others of which
have been settled law for decades, sometimes dating back to the
initiative's inception. The American v. Buckley case itself began
as a challenge not only to the three provisions debated by the
Court but as a radical assault on the requirement that the
petition circulation period be limited to six months, that
circulators attach to each petition an affidavit containing the
circulator's name and address, and that circulators be at least
18 years of age. The lower courts brushed aside each of these
1 1
challenges, and the Supreme Court refused to revisit them,
even though the length of the circulation period is more
important in determining a measure's chances for successful
qualification than whether circulators are registered voters. One
would be hard pressed to say why a six month window is a
"sensible" and "reasonable" regulation, as the Court of Appeals
concluded, 15 2 and a requirement that circulators be registered
150. Id. at 228; see also Court Denies Appeal on MarijuanaPetition, BANGOR DAILY
NEWS, July 29, 1998. Since Buckley v. American, residency requirements for initiative
petition circulators have been upheld in North Dakota (Initiative & Referendum
Institute v. Jaeger, 241 F. 3d 614 (81h Cir. 2001)), Mississippi (Kean v. Clark, 56 F. Supp.
2d 719 (S.D. Miss. 1999)), Maine (Initiative & Referendum Institute v. Secretary of State
of Maine, Civ. No. 98-104-B-C (D. Me. Apr. 1999)), and Idaho (Idaho Coalition United for
Bears v. Cenarrusa, Civ. No. 00-0668-S-BLW (D. Idaho Nov. 2001)).
151. Buckley v. American, 525 U.S. at 198.
152. Id. at 191 n.10.
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voters is unreasonable. Would three months still be reasonable,
or what about one month? And even if the circulation period is
not deemed by judges to be "reasonable" or "sensible," if the
voters and elected officials of a particular state decide that they
want to organize their initiative process in such a way as to
make ballot access extremely difficult, why should they not be
allowed to do so? How reasonable or sensible a particular
initiative regulation is depends on a prior political judgment
about the desirability of having a large number of initiatives on
the ballot. Courts simply have no business skiing on this
particular slope.
VII. WHAT'S LEFT FOR THE STATES?

The U.S. Supreme Court's decisions in the last quarter of
the twentieth century, beginning with Buckley v. Valeo, have
made it increasingly difficult for states to craft initiative
regulations that stop wealthy individuals from purchasing a
place on the ballot. The most effective way to achieve this goal
would be to limit contributions to initiative qualification
campaigns in the same way that we do for candidate campaigns,
but the Court's decisions in Bellotti 15 3 and Citizens Against Rent
Control 54 have ruled out this option. Banning paid signature
gatherers was seen by many states as an alternative way of
preventing the rich and powerful from paying their way onto the
ballot, but a decade later this option too was eliminated by the
Court in Meyer. The immediate impact of Buckley v. American is
less clear. If states can require circulators to be residents then
the registration requirement may not be necessary to achieve
the goal of preventing out-of-state circulators. And if states can
still require circulators to wear badges that identify them as
paid circulators, or to disclose that information on the petition
itself, then the absence of the individual's name on the badge is
not particularly important. Finally, if states can compel
proponents to file monthly and final reports indicating the
sources of the money and how much they paid per signature,
then the media and citizens will have the information they need
to make informed judgments about the grassroots nature of the
initiative campaign. But even if Buckley v. American is given a
circumscribed reading, the ruling signals the Court's intention
to scrutinize restrictions on the signature gathering process.
153.
154.

435 U.S. 765 (1978).
454 U.S. 290 (1981).
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In the immediate aftermath of Buckley v. American,
initiative reformers wailed that "the Supreme Court ruling robs
states of the ability to fix a defective system,"1 55 while initiative
activists exulted that states would now have to keep their dirty
mits off signature gatherers. Both reactions are understandable,
but if the states' response to Meyer is any guide, neither
prognosis is entirely accurate. Banning paid signature gatherers
severely hampered states' ability to regulate the signature
gathering process, but it also spurred a flurry of efforts to find
alternative means to regulate and restrict paid signature
gatherers in ways that might pass constitutional muster.
Among the boldest responses to Meyer came from several
states - including Washington and Maine in 1993 and
Mississippi in 1996 - which prohibited payment per signature
but permitted initiative campaigns to pay by the hour or on
salary. The courts quickly beat back this subterfuge - the
Washington and Mississippi laws lasted barely a year, and the
Maine law only five. 15 6 The same law, however, has continued to
survive judicial challenge in North Dakota, which enacted its
prohibition on per signature payments in 1987 in reaction to
publicized instances of petition fraud associated with a 1986
state lottery initiative - the first North Dakota initiative in
many years to rely on paid signature gatherers. The district
court judge upheld the pay restriction, reasoning that the state's
argument that "a signature-based commission rate of
compensation encourages or promotes fraud" has "a commonsense basis," even if the evidence was "primarily anecdotal." The
restrictions, he concluded, were not "an impermissible burden"
on the free-speech and political advocacy rights of initiative
57
proponents.
155.
Voters On Their Own In Initiative Process, S.F. CHRON., January 18, 1999, at
A22.
156. LIMIT v. Maleng, 874 F. Supp. 1138 (W.D. Wash. 1994); Term Limits
Leadership Council v. Clark, 984 F. Supp. 470 (S.D. Miss. 1997); On Our Terms '97 PAC
v. Secretary of State of Maine, 101 F. Supp. 2d 19, 26 (D. Me. 1999). Wyoming prohibited
payment per signature in 1996, but the restriction has yet to be challenged in court. Email from Peggy Nighswonger, Elections Director, Wyoming, Office of the Secretary of
State, to the Author (March 13 & 27, 2000).
157. Initiative and Referendum Inst. v. Jaeger,No. A1-98-70 (D.N.D. 1999). See also
Dale Wetzel, Judge Throws out Petition Restrictions Challenge, BISMARK TRIBUNE,
August 3, 1999, at A3. In February 2001, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 8thCircuit
affirmed the district court's judgment. Initiative & Referendum Inst. v. Jaeger, 241 F.3d
614 (8th Cir. 2001). The effect of the law is hard to estimate, but North Dakota is one of
the few states where volunteer campaigns remain the norm. Of the eight initiatives on
the ballot in North Dakota between 1996 and 1998, five were qualified by volunteers
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The fraud argument worked for North Dakota in district
court, but it is a frail reed upon which to rest a challenge to paid
signature gatherers, as Maine found out when its prohibition on
per-signature payments was struck down in 1999. The Maine
law, like the North Dakota law, was challenged in federal court
by a coalition of out-of-state groups, including U.S. Term Limits,
the Initiative & Referendum Institute, and a California
signature gathering firm. The judge concluded that Maine had
"offered no evidence whatsoever that fraud is more pervasive
among circulators paid per signature, or even that fraud in
general has been a noteworthy problem in the lengthy history of
the Maine initiative and referendum process.' 158 Similarly, in
Washington in 1994, the court emphasized the absence of
"actual proof of fraud stemming specifically from the payment
per signature method of collection. " 15 9 The Washington judge
agreed with the Supreme Court in Meyer that there was no
reason to "assume that a professional circulator - whose
qualifications for similar future assignments may well depend
on a reputation for competence and integrity - is any more likely
to accept false signatures than a volunteer who is motivated
entirely by an interest in having the proposition placed on the
60
ballot."1
The Supreme Court is probably right that there is no strong
a priori reason to believe fraud is more likely among paid
signature gatherers than among volunteers. Nor do we have
systematic empirical evidence that relying on volunteers reduces
signature fraud, though neither do we yet have systematic
evidence that it does not reduce fraud. We do know that paid
signature campaigns generally have lower signature validity
rates, but an invalid signature is not usually a result of fraud on
the part of the signature gatherer. More often an invalid
signature results from unregistered voters signing petitions,
which is fraud only if the circulator knows the signer is not a
registered voter. Paid signature gatherers may be more careless
about checking whether a signer is a registered voter but one
would be hard pressed to label that sort of behavior as fraud.

exclusively. E-mail from Cory Fong, Office of the Secretary of State, North Dakota, to the
Author (November 23, 1999).
158. Per-SignaturePayments to Petition Gatherers OI1d A U.S. Magistrate Rules
that a Maine Ban on the Practiceis Unneeded, PORTLAND PRESS HERALD, December 12,
1999, at B6.
159. Maleng, 874 F. Supp. at 1140-41.
160. Id. at 1141 (quoting Meyer, 486 U.S. at 426).
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Moreover, every initiative state already has in place an
elaborate system for checking and weeding out invalid
signatures, so the presence of invalid signatures need not pose a
great threat to the integrity of the initiative process. Finally,
petitioners who knowingly pad a petition with false signatures
are liable to criminal prosecution.
Although fraud prevention is typically the dominant theme
inside the courtroom, reactions outside the courtroom in Maine
and North Dakota showed that for many people restrictions on
paid signature gatherers have less to do with preventing fraud
than with preserving the integrity of the initiative process by
encouraging volunteer efforts and discouraging qualification
campaigns that rely only on money. North Dakota's leading
newspaper hailed the district court's decision as a victory "for
states' rights and common sense." The prohibition against
paying circulators by the signature, they explained, was
"intended to discourage 'shortcuts,"' and to make it more
difficult for people who wanted to buy their way on the ballot. If
North Dakota wanted to promote this end, why shouldn't they
161
be allowed to? "It's nobody's business but North Dakota's."
Maine's Secretary of State explained his dismay at the Maine
court's decision by stressing that "the citizen initiative process is
an important part of our democratic process, and it is our
responsibility to ensure the integrity of this process for the
citizens of Maine. We strive to keep the focus on 'citizens' in the
1 62
citizen initiative process.
If civic concerns are slighted in the legal arguments, while
fraud is invoked, as one lawyer involved in Buckley v. American
complained, as "a talismanic incantation," 163 that is largely the
fault of the United States Supreme Court, whose decisions have
forced states to frame their defense on the shallower grounds of
fraud. By accepting the patently false premise that a state's
interest in ensuring an initiative has a broad base of public
support is adequately protected by a signature requirement (in
Meyer), and denying that corruption or the appearance of
corruption was relevant to initiative campaigns (in Bellotti and

161. ProcessBelongs to States, BISMARCK TRIBUNE, August 12, 1999, at A4.
162. Per-SignaturePayments to Petition Gatherers OK'd A U.S. Magistrate Rules
that a Maine Ban on the Practice is Unneeded, supra note 158.
163. Richard Carelli, Court Considers How Much States Can Regulate Ballot
Initiatives, Associated Press wire report (Oct. 14, 1998) (quoting Denver attorney Neil
O'Toole), reprinted as Richard Carelli, Court Mulls Ballot Initiatives, ASSOCIATED PRESS
ONLINE, Oct. 14, 1998, availableat 1998 WL 21171857.
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Citizens Against Rent Control), the Supreme Court seems to
have left no room for the expression of legitimate civic concerns
about the democratic health of the initiative process. The
Court's sweeping rulings allow no place for some of the most
important reasons the people of a state might want to restrict or
regulate paid signature gatherers, including making it more
difficult for wealthy individuals to purchase a place on the ballot
and promoting grass-roots volunteerism. One might think that it
is more than reasonable for a state be permitted to regulate its
political process so as to ensure that wealthy individuals like
Loren Parks or George Soros cannot purchase a place on the
ballot with the same impunity that they might acquire a yacht
or a vacation home. Under the court's reasoning only if Parks or
Soros are foolish enough to attempt to purchase their place on
the ballot through fraudulent means does the state have a
compelling interest to regulate the payment of signature
gatherers. Having reduced democratic concerns about the
integrity of the initiative process to little more than the
prevention of forgery and bribery, the Supreme Court not only
weakens the initiative process but impoverishes democratic
discourse in the United States.
Despite the Supreme Court's rulings, however, the states
continue to be laboratories of reform. In Alaska, for instance,
where there were 5 initiatives in 1998 (only the initiative
heavyweights, California, Colorado, and Oregon, had more that
year), the legislature responded with legislation that restricted
anyone from being paid more than $1 per signature. At the time
the bill was enacted in 1998, few if any initiative campaigns in
Alaska had paid more than one dollar per signature; but
inflation ensures that the limitation, if left alone, will impact
qualification drives in the near future. Moreover, since the price
of signatures is affected by the number of petitions being
circulated, the $1 limit will be felt most acutely in elections
where a large number of initiatives are vying for ballot access.
Its effect will be relatively slight, however, when the number of
initiatives being circulated is small. What impact the law will
have on paid signature gatherers and whether it will survive
constitutional challenge has yet to be seen.
In Oregon, paid petition gatherers have recently been
redefined as employees rather than as independent contractors,
thus making a signature gathering firm liable for payment of
unemployment benefits. This regulatory change, which
increases the cost of gathering signatures, was instituted not by
https://scholarworks.umt.edu/mlr/vol64/iss1/4
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the legislature but by an administrative audit after an
individual circulator filed for unemployment compensation and
listed a signature gathering firm as her last employer. The
Employment Department's determination that the individual
had been an employee of the signature gathering firm was
affirmed by an administrative law judge and then upheld in
1999 by the Oregon Court of Appeals, 164 much to the chagrin of
Bill Sizemore, who predicted "it would be a heavy wet blanket on
the entire initiative process."' 65 The near record number of
initiatives on the 2000 Oregon ballot suggests the blanket was
nowhere near as suffocating as Sizemore feared.
Even restrictions that Buckley v.American explicitly struck
down have not been automatically repealed elsewhere. In April
1999, for instance, a federal judge in Maine upheld that state's
power to require initiative petitioners be registered voters.
Unlike Colorado, where as many as one third of the voting-age
population were not registered to vote, in Maine less than two
percent of the eligible population is not registered. The Maine
law was constitutional, the judge reasoned, because unlike the
Colorado law it did not significantly shrink the pool of
circulators nor make it more difficult to qualify an initiative.
Because the burden on initiative sponsors in Maine was at most
"slight," a less stringent standard of review was appropriate. It
was sufficient that the registration requirement served a
"legitimate" state interest in administrative efficiency. 166 The

164. Canvasser v. Employment Dept., 987 P.2d 562 (Or. Ct. App. 1999).
165. David Kravets, Signature GatheringFacingCourt Fight, STATESMAN JOURNAL
(Salem, Or.), February 5, 1999, at C3 (quoting Bill Sizemore). In February 2000, the
Oregon Supreme Court let stand the Court of Appeals' ruling in Canvasserby refusing to
review the decision. Canvasser, 987 P.2d 564, review denied, 994 P.2d 132 (Or. 2000).
The original hearing before the administrative law judge opened a revealing window on
the underworld of signature gathering. Rhonda Buffington had set up a political
consulting business (Affinity Communication) and obtained a contract with a large
California signature gathering firm, Kimball Petition Management, to coordinate the
campaigns for three measures that Kimball had contracted to get on the ballot.
Buffington's duty was to recruit individuals to gather signatures, and to this end she
hired an office staff of four persons, whom both sides in the case agreed were properly
considered employees, and about four hundred people, most of whom she did not know
and who by the time of the trial had "scattered to the far ends of the country." Most of
the people who were gathering signatures for Affinity were also gathering for other
firms, and according to testimony, some of these circulators were carrying "as many as
22 petitions." Tr. of July 10, 1999, hearing at 26, Affinity Communication v. Crosley
(before the Oregon State Employment Office), rev'd sub nom. Canvasser Serv. Inc. v.
Employment Dep't, 987 P.2d 562 (Or. Ct. App. 1999).
166. Initiative & Referendum Institute v. Secretary of State of Maine, Civ. No. 98104-B-C, 25-27 (D. Me. Apr. 1999).
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state's residency requirement was more burdensome, but the
judge agreed with the state that Maine had a "compelling"
interest in "ensuring that Maine is governed by Mainers.' 6 7
Petition circulators, the judge noted, "play a vital role in the
process of self-government [and so] the state may reasonably
require that such circulators be residents of Maine." 168 A
residency requirement also served the state's "important"
interest in making it easier for the state to hold "circulators
1 69
answerable for infractions of its initiative laws."
Despite the Supreme Court's sweeping language in Meyer,
which seemed to call into question all state restrictions that
"make it less likely that appellees will garner the number of
signatures necessary to place the matter on the ballot,"' 70 courts
have shown little appetite for using this test to strike down the
most consequential restrictions on circulators, including
circulation windows and geographic distribution requirements.
Although there have been numerous challenges to such
provisions since the Meyer decision, courts have, until very
recently, generally upheld geographic requirements and brief
circulation periods.
So far there are two exceptions. First is a decision rendered
late in 2001 by the U.S. District Court in Idaho. A federal judge
struck down Idaho's geographic distribution requirement, which
required that the state's six percent signature threshold be
reached in half of the state's 44 counties. The judge reasoned
that because over 60 percent of Idaho's population resides in
about one-fifth of the state's counties, the geographic
distribution requirement violated the Equal Protection Clause
by giving the "rural voters preferential treatment."' 7' The state

167. Id. at 26.
168. Id. at 27.
169. Id.
170. Meyer v. Grant, 486 U.S. 414, 423 (1988).
171. Idaho Coalition United for Bears v. Cenarrusa, Civ. No. 00-0668-S-BLW (D.
Idaho Nov. 30, 2001). The judge also struck down a 1933 statute that made it "a felony
for any person to.. offer, propose, threaten or attempt to sell, hinder or delay any
petition or any part thereof or of any signatures. .. ." The judge reasoned that a person
could reasonably believe that "this statute could easily be interpreted to prohibit the
common practice of paying circulators on a per-signature basis." Id. An official in the
Idaho Secretary of State's office conceded that the statute is "about as clear as mud." Email from Peggy Ysursa, Administrative Secretary, Elections Division, Office of the
Secretary of State, Idaho, to the Author (Oct. 18, 1999). However, the state has
consistently taken the position that this statute was not designed to prevent paid
signature gathering.
No individual had ever been prosecuted for paid signature
gathering, and it was widely recognized in the state that paid signature gathering was
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has appealed this decision to the 9'h U.S. Circuit Court of
Appeals, arguing that the judge's decision had failed "to take
into account the fact that the initiative and referendum powers
are not fundamental or federal rights but powers expressly
granted only by the states and are therefore subject to
' 172
reasonable rules and regulations regarding their governance."
The second exception is the recent decision by a divided
Utah Supreme Court, which found geographic distribution
requirements to be in violation of both the state constitution and
the federal constitution. Using a logic the U.S. Supreme Court
applied to redistricting cases in the early 1960s in Baker v.
Carr173 and Reynolds v. Simms, 174 the Utah court said the
geographic distribution requirement rule rendered "a signature
in Daggett County, whose population is 0.1 percent of Salt Lake
County's population,... 1000 times as valuable as the signature
of a voter in Salt Lake County." 175 Although the petitioners
made a free speech claim based on the U.S. Supreme Court's
decisions in Meyer and Buckley v. American, the majority
neither relied on nor made reference to these cases, basing their
decision instead on the "uniform operation of laws" provision of
the state constitution and the Equal Protection Clause of the
U.S. Constitution. 1 76 The dissenting opinion did address the
relevance of Meyer and the free speech claim, and explicitly
rejected the notion that "core political speech" was burdened by

permissible. In fact, most of the initiative campaigns in the 1990s had qualified by
paying for signatures. So it is hard to see how this statute could reasonably be construed
as having a chilling effect on circulators, as the judge maintained.
172. Mark Warbis, State Appeals Federal Judge's Decision, Associated Press State
& Local Wire (Dec. 31, 2001). Two other states in the 9th Circuit have geographic
distribution requirements that would be at risk if the appeal was upheld: Montana and
Nevada. Prior to 2002, Montana's distribution requirement was based on legislative
districts and was not especially onerous - only requiring the requisite signatures to be
gathered in one-third of the state's 100 legislative districts for statutory initiatives and
two-fifths for constitutional initiatives. Montana's law was thus easily distinguishable
from Idaho's. Passage of CI-37 and CI-38 in 2002, however, places Montana's
distribution requirement in great jeopardy if the district court ruling is upheld because
CI-37 and CI-38 shift the basis of the distribution requirement to counties and at the
same time stiffen the law by requiring the requisite percentage of signatures be gathered
in at least half of the state's counties. So Montana's distribution requirement is now
virtually indistinguishable from Idaho's. Nevada requires that the requisite signatures
be reached in at least three quarters of the state's counties, a distribution requirement
which on its face appears to be even more onerous and inequitable than Idaho's.
173. 369 U.S. 186 (1962).
174. 377 U.S. 533 (1964).
175. Gallivan v. Walker, 54 P.3d 1069, 1087 (Utah 2002).
176. Id. at 1099.
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the geographic distribution requirement. 177
That these decisions emerged out of Utah and Idaho is not
altogether surprising since their Republican-dominated state
legislatures have enacted a number of restrictive changes to the
initiative process in recent years. Idaho's geographic distribution
requirement was passed in 1997 as part of a package of
initiative ref6rms that also included shortening the circulation
period to 18 months and requiring petitions to indicate in bold
red type whether a circulator was a volunteer or not (the latter
178
provision was repealed in 1999 after Buckley v. American).
Utah's requirement that the ten percent signature threshold be
achieved in two thirds of the counties dates from 1998, when the
legislature increased the number from half of the counties.
Several other states have also made signature gathering more
difficult in the past few years. In 1998, for instance, Maine
shortened its circulation window from three years to one year.
The same year, Wyoming voters approved a legislative
referendum that kept the 15 percent signature requirement
statewide but added a provision requiring petitioners also to
obtain 15 percent in at least two-thirds of the state's counties.
Prior to that, Wyoming's geographic distribution requirement
had been nominal, as petitioners only needed one signature in
two-thirds of the counties.
The irony is that states that are least in need of tighter
restrictions often seem to be the ones most inclined to make
qualification more difficult. Wyoming, for instance, has the
highest signature threshold of any state, and has only had seven
initiatives on the ballot in three decades. Utah had fewer
initiatives on the ballot in the 1990s (three) than any other state
except Illinois and Mississippi. A number of high use states have
distribution
geographic
considered
adding
seriously
requirements or even increasing signature requirements, but
the proposals have generally failed. In Oregon in 1997, for
example, the legislature succeeded in referring to the voters a
177. Id. at 1106.
178. At the same time, Idaho changed its signature requirement from ten percent of
the number of votes in the last gubernatorial election to six percent of the number of
registered voters in the last general election. The total number of signatures required
under these two standards was roughly the same: in 1996 petitioners needed 41,335
signatures, while in 1998 they needed 42,026. The change was made to be consistent
with the new geographic distribution requirement, and it was also hoped that registered
voters would be a more stable basis for calculating signatures than a gubernatorial vote.
E-mail from Penny Ysursa, Administrative Secretary, Election Division, Office of the
Secretary of State, Idaho, to the Author (March 3, 2000).
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proposal that would have followed Mississippi's lead and
required one-fifth of all signatures be gathered in each of the
state's congressional districts, but the voters resoundingly
rejected the idea. In 1999, the Oregon legislature referred a
proposal to increase the number of signatures required for a
constitutional amendment from eight percent to twelve percent,
179
but again the voters repudiated the change.
If courts will allow restrictions that make ballot
qualification substantially more difficult, and the evidence
generally suggests they will, that does not answer the harder
question of whether such restrictions are good policy. If states
make the signature gathering process more difficult by
increasing the number of signatures required or by mandating a
geographic distribution requirement, they will advantage those
groups with the greatest financial and organizational resources.
Signature gathering firms will be in even greater demand, and
179. Although voters rejected the legislature's signature hike, Oregon has
nonetheless experienced a substantial de facto increase in the number of signatures
required to qualify an initiative. This stealth increase has occurred as a result of a
dramatic increase in the number of signatures deemed invalid by the secretary of state's
office: from 17 percent in 1996 and 1998 to 25 percent in 2000 and 31 percent in 2002. In
fact the highest invalidity rate in 1998 (25 percent) was less than the lowest invalidity
rate in 2002 (27 percent)! The sharp increase in signatures declared invalid has a
number of causes, but among the most important was a March 2000 directive by the
Oregon Elections Division instructing county clerks not to count initiative signatures by
"inactive voters," a category established by the U.S. Congress in 1993. Initially used by
the state for voters who moved and failed to re-register, the category was expanded by
the state legislature in 1999 to include voters who had not voted for five years. The
legislature's aim in pruning inactive voters from the rolls was to make it easier to reach
the 50 percent turnout threshold for tax increases that had been imposed, ironically, by a
Sizemore-sponsored initiative in 1996. The additional increase in invalidity rates
between 2000 and 2002 was likely due to the heightened scrutiny induced by having
outside observers challenging signatures and observing the signature checking.
Normally when a signature is deemed valid it is not checked again, but when it is
deemed invalid it goes through a second or even third review. By successfully
challenging signatures initially deemed valid, outside observers helped government
officials identify more invalid signatures. In addition, the oversight itself may have been
a factor. As Patty Wentz of the Voter Education Project puts it, "I know I'm more careful
in my job when people are watching me." E-mail from Patty Wentz, Voter Education
Project, to the Author (Aug. 6, 2002). At least one of the Oregon initiatives that failed to
qualify in 2002 - Sizemore's anti-union measure which was deemed to have missed by a
few hundred signatures - was clearly a casualty of this moving signature target. The
invalidity rate for Sizemore's measure, which attracted particularly close scrutiny from
the union-funded Voter Education Project, climbed to over 35 percent, the highest of any
of the measures submitted to the secretary of state's office. Two other measures - a term
limits measure and campaign finance measure - would likely have qualified if they had
been submitted in the 1990s. Both needed validity rates close to 79 percent to reach the
required threshold, a validity rate that was commonplace in the 1990s. In fact, in 1996
and 1998 only four of the 26 initiatives that qualified for the ballot fell below a 79
percent validity rate.
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ordinary citizens will find it more difficult to place their issues
on the ballot. The only way to make signature gathering firms
and money less important in the qualification phase is to relax
the signature requirements. But opening the floodgates to more
initiatives, particularly in states where the ballot is already
crowded with direct legislation, is not an attractive reform
option. By forbidding states from limiting contributions to
qualification campaigns and then forbidding them from banning
paid signature gatherers, the United States Supreme Court has
created a no-win situation for states wishing to reform the
signature gathering process. Absent a judicial change of heart,
what if anything can states do to extricate themselves from the
horns of this court-induced dilemma?
VIII. WHAT IS TO BE DONE?
"Publicity," Louis Brandeis famously observed, "is justly
commended as a remedy for social and industrial diseases.
Sunlight is said to be the best of disinfectants; electric light the
most efficient policeman."1 8 0 The majority in Buckley v. Valeo
and the dissent in Buckley v. American both quoted this passage
approvingly in their defense of disclosure requirements, and it
suggests a place where states could fruitfully concentrate their
reform energies without advantaging the rich and powerful.
States could enact laws that require petitioners to disclose
whether they are using paid petitioners. Oregon enacted such a
law in the 1980s, and other states have recently followed suit.
Alaska, Missouri and Utah, for instance, all enacted a similar
requirement in 1999. Initiative campaigns could also be
compelled to report precisely how much they paid to gather
signatures, as well as the number of signatures gathered using
paid petitioners and the number of signatures gathered using
volunteers. Montana did something like this in 1999 when the
state legislature passed a law requiring that those who employ
paid signature gatherers must file financial disclosure reports,
which must include the amount paid to each signature
gatherer.181
Such laws would be even more useful if they required the
government not only to collect this sort of data but to compile
180. Louis BRANDEIS, OTHER PEOPLE'S MONEY (1933), quoted in Buckley v. Valeo,
424 U.S. 1, 67 (1976), and Buckley v. American Constitutional Law Found., 525 U.S.
182, 223 (1999).
181.
See MONT. CODE ANN. § 13-27-112 (2002).
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and publish it in a form that is readily accessible and
understandable to ordinary citizens. This information could be
disclosed to the government immediately after the signatures
are submitted, and the government could make the information
available to voters at least one month prior to the election.
Financial and in-kind contributions to the qualification phase of
an initiative campaign could also be made available to the public
at the same time. The aim of such laws would not be to prevent
fraud, but to inform voters about how initiatives qualified for
the ballot. Under the current legal framework in which one
wealthy individual can essentially purchase a place on the
ballot, preserving the integrity of the initiative process means
that states need to inform voters about whether a ballot
measure qualified because a few wealthy individuals paid for
signatures or whether it qualified because of the efforts of
thousands of volunteers.
Is there anything states can do beyond collecting
information and making it more readily available to voters,
journalists, and researchers? One radical option, dubbed "the
cynic's choice," would be to abandon signature gathering
altogether, and instead require (or at least allow) petitioners to
pay a hefty filing fee. Paid signature gathering firms would go
out of business, states would be saved the considerable expense
of verifying signatures, and the amount that would have been
spent qualifying the initiative could instead be used by the state
for any number of socially useful purposes.18 2 The virtue of such
a proposal is that it would strip away the populist veneer that
masks the financial realities of today's signature gathering
process. Yet the plan obviously does nothing to make the
qualification process a more meaningful reflection of citizen
interests, nor does it help to make money less important in the
process. The proposal does not so much reform the system as
admit defeat.
More appealing perhaps is a proposal to make signatures
gathered by volunteers count for more than signatures gathered
by paid petitioners. 8 3 Allowing for a "volunteer's bonus" would
enable states to encourage volunteer involvement in signature
gathering without restricting the rights of individuals to hire
paid signature gatherers. If done in conjunction with an increase
182. See Lowenstein & Stern, supra note 79, at 200 n.116; DUBOIS & FEENEY, supra
note 4, at 102-04.
183. See Tolbert, Lowenstein & Donovan, supra note 125, at 37; Lowenstein &
Stern, supra note 79, at 219-23; Garrett, supra note 58, at 1873-76.
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in the number of signatures required, such a two-tiered scheme
could simultaneously make qualification more difficult for
initiatives relying on paid signature gatherers and easier for
initiatives relying largely or entirely on volunteers. Nebraska
considered such a two-tiered plan in 1995, but the proposal was
eventually defeated amidst concerns that the volunteer's bonus
might violate equal protection guarantees and that it might
prove difficult to administer and enforce. One notable limitation
of the proposal is that although it stimulates grassroots
involvement and makes it more likely that a qualifying measure
has a cadre of devoted partisans who care intensely about the
proposal, it does not address the problem that "signatures,
whether gathered by volunteers or paid solicitors, are simply not
184
meaningful gauges of public discontent or even interest."
What, if anything, can be done to make it more likely that the
measures that qualify for the ballot resemble issues that
ordinary citizens are most concerned about?
In the initiative's early years, this question frequently
prompted the suggestion that petitions be left with county
registration officers and signed only in their presence. In part
this proposal was intended to reduce fraud, but it was also
designed to ensure that an initiative reflected voters' concerns.
"Everyone knows," declared the Eugene Register in 1913,
that under the present system petitions do not express real
opinion. They are signed for a variety of reasons, among which are
desire to be rid of the solicitor or to help him earn a day's wages,
and the natural tendency to do that which is requested providing
it costs nothing. Petitions signed voluntarily by persons who would
take the trouble to go to the registration clerk... would be a real
18 5
call from the people for initiating or referring any measure.

One could make the petitions available at other public locations
as well, including public libraries or fire stations. Initiative
sponsors could still spend unlimited amounts of money to hire
solicitors who would explain the measure to interested citizens,
distribute relevant literature, and urge citizens to sign. Having
learned about the initiative, the individual citizen would then
need to make the effort to go to one of the designated public
locations and sign the petition. Money would still matter in the
qualification phase, but its importance relative to issue appeal

184.

DuBois & FEENEY, supra note 4, at 105; see also PATRICK B. McGUIGAN, THE

POLITICS OF DIRECT DEMOCRACY IN THE 1980S: CASE STUDIES IN POPULAR DECISION

MAKING 117 (1985) (reproducing an interview with Sue Thomas).
185. BARNETT, supra note 37, at 5; see also KEY & CROUCH, supra note 46, at 562.
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(and organization) would be reduced. Of course, without a
change in the number of required signatures such a reform
would render the initiative process virtually unusable. But if
this reform was linked to a dramatic reduction in the number of
signatures required, as it should be, qualifying a measure could
become much easier for initiative sponsors who tap into genuine
citizen grievances or concerns. Whereas proponents of popular or
controversial issues would find qualification substantially
easier, those pushing issues about which people cared little
would find the process much more onerous. But if the purpose of
gathering signatures is to demonstrate breadth and depth of
public support, that is exactly the way the process should
work.186

A more modest but probably more realistic proposal is to
press state officials to monitor the signature gathering process
more closely. Elections officials would not dream of leaving
polling places unattended, yet signature gathering is routinely
conducted without any observers monitoring the process. An
interesting experiment was tried in Oregon this past year by a
union-funded watchdog organization calling itself the Voter
Education Project (VEP). The project's aim was twofold: to
identify signature fraud and forgeries committed by signature
gatherers and to promote voter education about their rights and
responsibilities as petition signers. The VEP sent staff into the
field, directly onto the turf of the signature gatherer. Their aim,
as their slogan has it, is to get people to "think before you ink."
They hand out fliers, talk with people to make sure they
understand what they are signing, and even videotape signature
gatherers where they suspect fraud or deception.
The project's effect on voter education is difficult to
quantify, but its impact in identifying fraud and forgery has
been unmistakable. Between November 2001 and June 2002
VEP filed complaints against 15 paid signature gatherers for
forging signatures and misleading signers. At the time of this
writing, most of these complaints were still pending
investigation, but two people had been convicted of forgery. One
of the signature gatherers admitted that "he would not be
surprised" if the number of valid signatures on his petitions was
in single digits. The other signature gatherer who was convicted

186. See Daniel Lowenstein, Election Law Miscellany: Enforcement, Access to
Debates, Qualificationof Initiatieves, 77 TEX. L. REV. 2007 (1999); DuBOIS & FEENEY,
supra note 45, at 85-88; DuBoIS & FEENEY, supra note 4, at 106-09.

Published by ScholarWorks at University of Montana, 2003

61

MONTANA
REVIEW
Montana Law
Review, Vol.LAW
64 [2003],
Iss. 1, Art. 4

Vol. 64

estimated his valid signatures at about 50 percent. Both
"acknowledged forging signatures, using fraudulent addresses
and fraudulent counties, and knowingly having non-registered
voters sign petitions."18 7 After being informed by the state of the
fraud perpetrated by these signature gatherers, Sizemore
decided that he would not use any of the signatures gathered by
these two individuals, which ended up costing Sizemore's anti188
union measure its spot on the 2002 ballot.
More important, the evidence and publicity generated by
the Voter Education Project helped secure a commitment from
the Secretary of State's office to create a position that would be
responsible for proactively monitoring the signature gathering
process. Potentially even more consequential is that the
evidence of fraud compiled by the VEP may provide the evidence
of fraud that courts have said a state needs to justify restrictions
on paid signature gatherers. And with the passage of Measure
26 in November - a measure that would ban payment by
signature but allow payment by the hour - the state will need
that evidence if the measure is to survive the inevitable court
challenges.
It is unfortunate that the U.S. Supreme Court has
diminished our political discourse by reducing the concept of
democratic integrity to the petty crimes of fraud and forgery.
Absent a judicial change of heart or dramatic legislative action
(both very unlikely), the main responsibility for ensuring the
integrity of the initiative process will rest with individual
citizens, who should refuse to sign an initiative petition until
they have read the proposed bill carefully and thought about it
for a long while. Nobody should sign just to be nice or
accommodating, or because they feel sorry for the poor man or

187. Letter from Assistant Attorney General Steven Briggs to Bill Sizemore,
communicated via e-mail from Patty Wentz, Voter Education Project, to the Author (July
8, 2002).
188. Further evidence of pervasive signature fraud has emerged as a result of a
lawsuit filed against Sizemore by the Oregon Education Association and the Oregon
chapter of the American Federation of Teachers. According to the testimony of Saul
Klein, who managed several signature gathering campaigns for Sizemore and other chief
petitioners, forgery is a "constant menace" when paying by the signature. According to
Klein, the most common method of forgery is to obtain a signature on one petition sheet
and then copy that person's signature and address onto the sheets for other petitions the
circulator is carrying. Since paid circulators will often carry between five and 10
initiatives at the same time, the potential for fraud is clearly great. Patty Wentz, Voters
Education Project, News Release (Sept. 17, 2002); William McCall, Sizemore Business
Associate Says Petition Fraud a 'Menace,' Associated Press State and Local Wire (Sept.
17, 2002).
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because they want him out of their face so they can get on with
the shopping. Most of all, citizens should not give in to the
canard that they should sign so that the people can decide.
People should, as Oregon's Secretary of State Bill Bradbury has
said, "treat their signature as carefully as they do their vote." A
signature on a petition is not designed to be a measure of faith
in "the people" but of support for a particular policy. If citizens
sign petitions without scrutinizing the merits of what is
proposed, then a ballot loaded with initiatives is not a sign of
democratic vitality but rather an abrogation of civic
responsibility.
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